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Abstract 
This paper charts the current evidence on effectiveness of different anti-corruption reforms, and 
identifies significant evidence gaps. Despite a substantial amount of literature on corruption, this 
review found very few studies focusing on anti-corruption reforms, and even fewer that credibly assess 
issues of effectiveness and impact.  
The evidence was strong for only two types of interventions: public financial management (PFM) 
reforms and supreme audit institutions (SAIs). For PFM, the evidence in general showed positive 
results, whereas the effectiveness was mixed for SAIs. No strong evidence indicates that any of the 
interventions pursued have been ineffective, but there is fair evidence that anti-corruption authorities, 
civil service reforms and the use of corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions in general 
have not been effective. 
The paper advocates more operationally-relevant research and rigorous evaluations to build up the 
missing evidence base, particularly in conflict-afflicted states, in regards to the private sector, and on 
the interactions and interdependencies between different anti-corruption interventions.    
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1. Introduction 
Corruption has been identified as a major challenge to development and security,1 and is a key policy 
priority for donors.2 In fragile and conflict-affected countries, corruption risks are particularly 
pertinent.3
1.1 Methodology 
 Although the focus of donors and academics on corruption has prompted extensive research 
over the last 15 years, there remain significant gaps in our understanding of how to address corruption. 
Put simply, there is a large number of studies on corruption, but few on anti-corruption, and even 
fewer that answer questions around effectiveness and impact. Currently, there is no overview and 
assessment of the strength of evidence across the whole spectrum of anti-corruption reforms. Recent 
reviews of donor-supported anti-corruption efforts have highlighted the need for stronger evidence 
(Hanna et al. 2011; Norad 2011). Operationally, anti-corruption practitioners want evidence for what 
works, when, where, and why; and they also need to understand which interventions do not work in 
certain contexts, and why. 
This review focuses on the evidence for whether donor-supported interventions have succeeded in 
reducing corruption in recipient countries. These interventions can be both direct (with the primary 
purpose of reducing corruption) and indirect (the primary purpose is distinct from reducing corruption, 
but interventions are thought or have shown a reduction in corruption). They occur at the international, 
national, and sub-national levels, and encompass different understandings and strategies for how to 
fight corruption (such as normative change, better accountability and control, and changed incentives).  
The paper takes a systematic approach to identifying and evaluating the evidence, with the aim of 
identifying both gaps for future research, and of supporting anti-corruption practitioners in their 
assessments of the appropriateness of different policy and programming options. The breadth of the 
anti-corruption field and its overlap with a number of other areas (including but not limited to political 
economy analysis, governance, economic growth, and aid management processes), and the resources 
that could be devoted to this paper have required a trade-off between a comparative approach to the 
quality of the evidence for a comprehensive range of donor-supported anti-corruption interventions, 
and an in-depth examination akin to a systematic review. Given the objectives of this paper, the 
emphasis has been on the former. It is also expected that an intervention-focused perspective will yield 
the operationally most useful overview of the evidence, and help to identify relevant gaps and 
weaknesses in the literature. 
1.2 Selecting interventions 
Based on a review of the scope of donor-supported anti-corruption practices, and extensive discussions 
with anti-corruption practitioners, the review and evaluation of the evidence is structured around six 
intervention areas: 
• Public sector reform  
• Oversight institutions 
                                                     
1 See for example World Bank (2010). 
2 For example, the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has emphasized the risk corruption poses to the 
impact of aid programmes, highlighting both the fiduciary risks and the risks that corruption poses to the wider impact of aid 
programmes (2011).  
3 An indicator of this is the prevalence of conflict-affected countries in the bottom of a range of corruption indices. Sixteen 
out of the bottom 20 countries in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) have experienced 
conflict during the last five years. 
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• Civil society support 
• General budget support 
• Donors’ own systems 
• Multilateral agreements on international anti-corruption standards 
These areas were chosen on the basis that they covered the main direct and indirect anti-corruption 
activities that are supported by donors.  
Figure 1: Anti-corruption interventions pursued by donors4
 
 
 
                                                     
4 Source: Adapted from Johnsøn (forthcoming). 
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1.3 Sampling and assessing the evidence 
This paper does not constitute a full systematic review of the evidence. The relative lack of relevant 
literature required the authors to focus on key studies on the particular interventions, and then include 
evidence generated through different methods to maximize confidence in the robustness of the 
findings. The relevant evidence for each intervention has been identified by three sampling methods:  
• Expertise of anti-corruption scholars and personal knowledge of the literature; 
• Database searches (U4 website, Social Science Citation Index, World Bank Research Website, 
Google Scholar) for keywords, followed by analysis of abstracts; and 
• Meta-reviews and review articles,5
The only sampling criterion was relevance to the particular intervention, which was ascertained 
through the review of titles, abstracts, and if necessary a quick review of the paper. The annex to this 
paper gives information on the search processes used with regard to the six anti-corruption 
intervention categories. Generally, the number of relevant papers was relatively small so that no 
further sampling (i.e., according to methodology or type of study) was necessary, and all studies 
identified as relevant under the search criteria (rather than just key studies) were included.  
 based on which a limited snowball sampling method was 
used to identify primary research and key studies. 
Throughout the paper, the authors have used a common approach to critically appraise the strength of 
the evidence. While systematic judgements on the strength of individual pieces of research were made, 
the paper itself only rates the strength of evidence regarding particular interventions, rather than 
individual papers. Assessing the overall evidence for a particular intervention was deemed more useful 
both to identify gaps and areas that require further inquiry, and to provide guidance for anti-corruption 
practitioners.  
The assessment of the strength of the evidence for individual studies is based on the following criteria: 
• Type of data: we have differentiated between the following studies: (1) Quantitative, using 
existing dataset, (2) Quantitative, using own data, (3) Qualitative, interview-based or 
ethnographic observation, and (4) Other primary sources. Preference has not been given to any 
particular method (such as randomized controlled trials). However, at the intervention level 
the existence of studies with different methodologies (i.e., using both quantitative and 
qualitative data) that examine a particular type of intervention has been seen as a strength if 
such analysis is complementary and allows for the confirmation of research findings.    
• Quality of the methodology: the strength of the study’s methodology with regard to factors 
such as validity, transparency, acknowledgement of bias, conceptual relationships and wider 
context, and conclusions has been assessed.6
                                                     
5 Such as McGee and Gaventa (2001); Norad (2008); Fjeldstad and Isaksen (2008); Kolstad, Fritz, and Tam O’Neill (2008); 
Erickson and Hills (2007); and Andvig and Fjeldstad (2000). 
 The insights of studies lacking a strong 
methodology have been included, but with caveats about the robustness of the findings.  
6 These factors are operationalized in the following way:  
o Validity: Do indicators accurately capture the phenomenon the author is drawing conclusions about?  
o Transparency: Does the author provide sources of data used and/or describe data collection processes? 
o Acknowledgement of bias: Are potential biases acknowledged explicitly, is missing data identified and explained, 
and are interviewer/interviewee biases controlled for? 
o Conceptual relationships: Does the author distinguish between associations and correlations on the one hand, and 
causation on the other? Are “reverse causality” and spurious correlation issues addressed, and robustness checks 
conducted for quantitative data? 
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Based on the experience of full systematic reviews, we chose to adopt a “best possible” criterion 
instead of a “threshold” approach. In other words, studies have not been excluded even if they do not 
have a strong methodology, only if they are seen to be so weak as to not produce useful insights. 
Instead, judgement was made so as to include the best possible studies, allowing for some 
methodological flaws. 
The assessment of the strength of evidence for each category of interventions is based on:  
• Study relevance: whether studies address the relevant research questions;7
• Study quality: judgement on the collective quality of studies, based on the strength of the 
individual key studies’ methodologies;  
  
• Size of the body of evidence: the amount of credible and relevant evidence. 
The paper qualitatively assesses the strength of the evidence for each intervention, rather than 
numerically grading it. There are several reasons for that. First, a qualitative assessment allows for less 
formulaic assessment and exclusion criteria, and in this way should help to capture findings from the 
grey literature, which we expected to be important in particular to better understand the contextual 
factors that shape the impact of anti-corruption interventions. The qualitative assessment enables the 
paper to explicitly identify the particular methodological weaknesses associated with this part of the 
literature, and the implications of that for the robustness of the findings. Second, given that the overall 
assessment of the evidence is at the intervention level, not at the level of individual pieces of research, 
using a numerical grading system would raise problems of aggregation and would require attaching 
different weightings to individual pieces of research. It is not feasible to do so in a rigorous and 
transparent manner in the context of this paper, and any weighting would introduce biases into the 
assessment of the evidence.  
The qualitative grading categories regarding evidence used in this paper are: 
• Strong: five or more studies with strong research methodologies, using different research 
methods, show the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a category of interventions. 
• Fair: Three or more studies with acceptable research methodologies show the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of a category of interventions. 
• Weak: Fewer than three studies with acceptable methodologies can be identified to show 
either effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a category of interventions. 
In some cases the majority of studies present evidence for either the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
interventions, but in most cases the evidence was mixed, and in some cases the evidence was contested 
as individual papers arrived at contradictory conclusions. These terms refer to the consistency of the 
body of evidence. “Mixed” means that studies arrive at different but not contradictory conclusions. 
“Contested” refers to different and contradictory conclusions.  
1.4 Structure of the paper 
The paper is divided into 10 sections (including the introduction). Section 2 discusses problems of 
measuring corruption, which affect the ability to generate robust evidence for the impact of anti-
                                                                                                                                                                      
o Consideration of wider context: Is the broader literature contextualized, and the degree of generalizability 
considered? 
o Conclusions: Are conclusions supported by the analysis and its data?    
7 For each type of intervention the relevant research question was whether and how this intervention contributed to the 
reduction to corruption. See Annex 1 for details.  
U4 Issue 2012:7 Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption www.U4.no 
 
5 
corruption interventions. Section 3 briefly examines what this mapping has not addressed (e.g., the 
wider political economy of aid and corruption), setting the context for the evaluation of the evidence 
on specific anti-corruption interventions in sections 4 to 9. Section 10 concludes with observations on 
the overall quality of the evidence, and key evidence gaps revealed by this paper.  
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2. Measurement problems 
It is conceivable that the relatively limited amount of operationally oriented research and rigorous 
evaluations of anti-corruption efforts found in this paper may be linked to the view that corruption 
measurement problems (due to its clandestine, hidden nature) make it impossible to draw valid 
conclusions on the effectiveness of anti-corruption programmes. However, both the limited research 
that exists and the innovative methodologies some scholars have developed for measuring corruption 
suggest that establishing credible evidence for the effectiveness of many anti-corruption interventions 
is possible, if methodologically challenging (Kaufmann 1997; Olken and Pande 2011; Kaufmann, 
Kray, and Mastruzzi 2006).  
The three principal measurement problems with regard to corruption are: 
• Precisely measuring the scale of corruption; 
• Measuring change in corruption levels; and 
• Establishing causality between anti-corruption reforms and changes in corruption levels, and 
plausibly attributing changes to reform initiatives. 
2.1 Measuring the scale of corruption 
Problems related to the first challenge, precise measurement of corruption, are well documented and 
recognized in recent anti-corruption scholarship.8
To overcome these problems, studies have increasingly relied on surveys measuring the experience of 
corruption, which provide more reliable data, especially for so-called petty or administrative 
corruption.
 These include the continued reliance on perception-
based data (and related problems of societally specific understandings of corruption that challenge 
cross-country comparison), and problems of aggregating data from different surveys into a single 
figure used in corruption indices like Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  
9 Such experience or victimization data, however, not only measures differently (by 
focusing on experience rather than perception), but measures also something different, as such surveys 
track individual corrupt practices such as bribery, not “corruption” as an overarching concept.10
Other ways to overcome the problem of measuring the scale of a clandestine activity like corruption 
have been the reliance on indirect measurements, for example through Quantitative Service Delivery 
Surveys or the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys, which are considered to 
provide a reliable measure of petty corruption.
 
Corruption in the public sector is not just bribery, but also fraud, embezzlement, patronage, and so 
forth. 
11
                                                     
8See for example Galtung (2005) and Heller (2009).  
 Such methods, however, are still poorly utilized in the 
literature (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). It continues to be challenging for surveys to capture (a) 
estimates for grand corruption that is not directly experienced by large number of ordinary people and 
9 Daniel Treisman suggests that “[…] indices do not correlate as highly as one might expect with citizens’ actual experiences 
with corruption as measured by surveys of business managers and other victims” (2007, 213) and recommends that one needs 
to “[…] refine and gather more experience-based measures of corruption” (2007, 241). See also Olken (2009). 
10 See for example Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri (2011).  
11 Petty corruption entails all the (mostly financial) demands from low- and mid-level officials to expedite a public service 
(such as issuing a license or document) or to grant access to services (such as healthcare or education). It is often contrasted 
with grand corruption that takes place at the level of the political leadership, involving individuals who have the capacity to 
change and make instrumental the institutions of the state towards their own private benefit.  
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cannot be captured through experience surveys, and (b) practices such as nepotism, the impact of 
which is difficult to quantify and also have highly societally specific definitions.12
2.2 Measuring changes in corruption  
  
The second challenge concerns the measurement of change. In some cases it can be relatively 
straightforward to identify indirect measurements of changes in corruption at the micro-level of 
specific corrupt practices and in response to particular interventions (e.g., by whether procurement 
costs for particular services have declined, or whether salaries are no longer skimmed off by 
superiors). Measuring changes in overall levels of corruption, however, is challenged in particular by a 
lack of longitudinal data, especially panel data. Furthermore, the data from popular corruption indices 
is not always comparable over time, as the kind of data that is aggregated to form the indices can 
change over time.    
A related problem is that different anti-corruption interventions target and affect different kinds of 
corruption. Some civil service reform interventions might be able to reduce bribery, but not nepotism 
or patronage. If measurements do not distinguish between the two types of corruption, data values will 
be distorted. 
2.3 Establishing causality 
The final challenge is that of establishing causality between an intervention (actions of a programme, 
policy, or institution) and changes in levels of corruption, arising in particular from a lack of 
intervention-specific data. There are three main reasons for this.  
First, it can be difficult to insulate the impact of a particular anti-corruption intervention from wider 
governance reforms within which such interventions are frequently embedded, unless a systematic 
impact evaluation design is integrated into the programme design. This review found no impact 
evaluations of donor-funded anti-corruption programmes.  
Second, as donor evaluations are often short-term exercises that have no or few indicators/data to work 
from, they often reveal little about how and why an intervention has succeeded or failed.13
Third, without specific data on the outputs and outcomes of projects it is not possible to assess their 
effectiveness, or to attribute that performance to impact-level changes. Lacking intervention-specific 
data, studies often rely on popular data sources such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, or the Global Corruption Barometer. However, these indices do 
not take the performance of a particular intervention as their point of departure. As such, they can only 
 Academic 
studies are also rarely focused on question of effectiveness or impact, and few of them have 
incorporated comparison groups or counterfactual scenarios in their methodology, which limits their 
ability to prove that observed changes could safely be attributed to the intervention (Schmidt 2005). 
To provide credible evidence for how and why a strategy, programme, or institution has succeeded or 
failed, it is generally necessary to establish unique indicators for that particular intervention, gather 
data over time, and evaluate whether the relevant outcomes/impacts have been achieved. As observed 
by Schmidt, most studies focus “on explaining the lack of success rather than studying the very anti-
corruption measures in systematic and comparative ways” (2005, 216). 
                                                     
12 An interesting effort to capture the scale of grand corruption is through the stock-exchange values of politically connected 
firms. See in particular Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006). 
13 To provide credible evidence for how and why a strategy, programme, or institution has succeeded or failed, it is generally 
necessary to establish unique indicators for that particular intervention, gather data over time, and evaluate whether the 
relevant outcomes/impacts have been achieved. 
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inform whether corruption levels have changed in a country, or whether the institutional set-up is more 
likely to be “corruption-proof.” One cannot automatically draw the conclusion that a project has 
performed well just because these indices show positive changes, or vice versa.  
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3. What this paper does not capture 
Evaluating the evidence of donor-supported anti-corruption interventions in developing countries 
requires attention to the wider political economy of corruption in such environments. Such a 
perspective provides a framework for understanding many of the contextual factors that contribute to 
the success or failure of different anti-corruption interventions. Ill-defined concepts such as “political 
will” that are identified in a range of studies as a central facilitating or (if lacking) obstructing factor 
for reforms cannot be adequately accounted for in a review, nor can for example bad implementation 
of otherwise good reforms. A review would ideally also assess the underlying principles, strategies, 
corruption types, and contexts of the reforms (as shown in the vertical columns in figure 1). This is 
however not possible with the large majority of studies.  
The study focuses on anti-corruption interventions, not the drivers of corruption. The work did 
however reveal a blind spot in the literature regarding the impact of aid itself on corruption. Popular 
discussions of aid and governance often associate the substantial aid inflows into developing and 
conflict-affected countries with heightened corruption, and attribute the ineffectiveness of particular 
aid efforts to corruption.14 Such arguments are mostly based on anecdotal evidence of the impact of 
aid on corruption, or on detailed investigations of single cases.15 Aid can distort the economies of 
developing countries, especially conflict-affected countries. If aid flows exceed the country’s capacity 
to absorb these funds, they fuel rent seeking16 and provide incentives for corruption in the process 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, systematic evidence of the impact of aid on corruption is 
conflicting, identifying both positive and negative impacts of aid,17 not least because of poor data 
especially in conflict-affected countries, and because of the problems of meaningfully measuring 
corruption, and the difficulty of comparing different proxy variables used in country-specific 
corruption research.18
What recent research has highlighted is that in fragile states in particular, aid spent off-budget and 
bypassing the state are often found to further weaken state authority; and that aid and informal social 
service delivery by NGOs or communities at the local level often revives and reinforces the patronage 
power of local elites, who become the gatekeepers to aid and services (Ghani and Lockart 2008; 
Jackson 2005; Nakaya 2008). 
  
The following sections (4 through 9) set out to evaluate the evidence on specific anti-corruption 
interventions identified through the mapping exercise, with each section concluding with observations 
on the quality of the evidence for each category of interventions. 
                                                     
14 For example, see Moyo (2009). 
15 Good examples of such detailed studies include several studies on Afghanistan by the Feinstein Centre. See for example 
Fishstein (2010) and Gordon (2011). 
16 Rent seeking describes behaviour where individuals or organizations capture income and resources, normally through 
political connections and influence, for private benefit rather than productive use.  
17 Thus, one study finds that aid increases corruption (Knack 2001), while another suggests that it helps to reduce it (Tavares 
2003). 
18 For a more detailed discussion, see von Billerbeck (2011). 
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4. Public sector reforms  
The majority of donor-funded anti-corruption programming targets public sector institutions. It aims to 
protect public funds from theft and fraud, public office from nepotism and favouritism, and public 
institutions from capture by elites. Anti-corruption reforms have therefore traditionally been centred 
on corruption risks in bureaucratic institutions to limit public servants’ discretion and institute control 
measures. Decades of research, pioneered by scholars such as Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard 
(1988), have shown that control and sanctions have an effect on individual incentives to be corrupt. 
Principles such as transparency, accountability, and competition—and specific incentives such as 
whistleblowing—have been documented to work if the right preconditions were present (Rose-
Ackerman and Truex 2012; Lambsdorff 2007; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Donors have 
built their public sector support programmes on these insights. The sub-sections below review the 
evidence for whether these public sector support programmes have been effective in reducing 
corruption, focusing on both the major direct and indirect public sector reforms pursued by donors.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that there has been a general re-orientation of donor focus from 
direct anti-corruption interventions towards addressing corruption in sector-based service delivery, 
through a strategy labelled “mainstreaming.”  Given that this is a relatively recent focus, not much 
evidence has actually been produced on the effectiveness of mainstreaming approaches. Some rigorous 
studies have been conducted in sectors such as education,19 health,20 water and sanitation,21 or 
transport.22 Individually these studies provide important contributions to understanding how (petty) 
corruption risks in sectors are best mitigated. However, as they are spread over many sectors and 
countries, firm generalizable conclusions are hard to draw at this stage. In sum, sector-specific, 
operational evidence is not available. A few rigorous studies produce evidence, but one should be 
careful to generalize from these beyond their sector, target reform, and context.23
4.1 Direct reforms 
 
In total, the literature search identified hundreds of studies examining public sector reforms aimed 
directly at addressing corruption. Sixteen studies were identified as relevant and of sufficient quality. 
The majority of these are qualitative single case studies or output-oriented donor evaluations.  A few 
quantitative studies were found, in particular on the impact of anti-corruption laws. Very little 
comparative and longitudinal work was found.  
Anti-corruption authorities  
A large number of qualitative case studies examine the effectiveness of anti-corruption authorities 
(ACAs). No studies using a quantitative research design could be found. Moreover, donor evaluations 
of ACAs are few and not of a sufficient quality to draw general conclusions on the effectiveness of 
ACAs. 
                                                     
19 For example, see Reinikka and Svensson (2005) and Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (forthcoming).  
20 For example, see Bjorkman and Svensson (2009). 
21 For example, see Davis (2003). 
22 For example, see Olken (2007). 
23 The health sector is arguably the sector that has received the most attention when it comes to the effectiveness of various 
interventions.  Many other very important sectors, including the natural resources sectors, have little evidence on intervention 
impacts. An example from education highlights the challenges. Many rigorous studies have been conducted on reforms to 
decrease teacher absenteeism, and some evidence produced on positive effects on such “quiet corruption.”  However, teacher 
attendance is only one component of an education programme, and there are many other corruption risks in the education 
“value chain” that can affect development outcomes. 
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There is general agreement across the studies that ACAs, which are considered to have been highly 
successful in reducing corruption in Hong Kong and Singapore, have generally failed to replicate such 
success in developing countries. The reasons for this include: 
• Uneven or insufficient financial support (Tangri and Mwenda 2006; Doig, Watt, and Williams 
2007); 
• Limited independence from political influence (Hussmann, Hechler, and Peñailillo 2009); 
• Weak mandates (Hussmann, Hechler, and Peñailillo 2009; Heilbrunn 2011); and 
• Lack of political will (Quah 2000). 
While the general agreement on their ineffectiveness might suggest that this is a robust finding, the 
evidence suffers from two important methodological limitations. First, the vast majority of studies take 
the ineffectiveness of ACAs as their point of departure, and focus on explaining this lack of success. 
This a priori assumption of failure is an obvious methodological problem, as few studies explicitly 
measure the effectiveness of such institutions. To the extent that explicit criteria for success or failure 
of ACAs are used, they either rely on performance metrics such as the number of investigations 
initiated, or responses to complaints. A few also link the success of an ACA to the country’s ranking 
on the CPI index (Heilbrunn 2004; Quah 2010; Meagher 2004). These indicators of effectiveness 
oversimplify reality and do not provide a fair assessment, as they only measure parts of what would 
constitute an effective ACA. 
Second, while the studies identify a range of different causes contributing to the limited impact of 
ACAs, what is lacking is a systematic evaluation of these different factors, indicated in particular by 
the lack of comparative work. It is therefore not possible to generalize whether the failure of ACAs is 
predominantly a problem of design, implementation, or the conditions within which they operate.  
Recent studies argue that earlier research and evaluations of ACAs have not sufficiently grasped all 
the aspects of these complex and varied institutions (Johnsøn et al. 2011; Recantini 2011). Most 
theories would predict that ACAs would not be effective in poor governance / high corruption 
environments (Shah and Shacter 2004), and studies rarely account for this in their assessment of 
effectiveness.  
While there is therefore a substantial amount of evidence for the very limited impact of most ACAs, 
the methodological weaknesses of this evidence—with regard both to their baseline for asserting 
failure, and to the actual causes contributing to their ineffectiveness—mean that the strength of the 
evidence can only be regarded as fair.  
Anti-corruption strategies 
The development of national anti-corruption strategies (NACS) has been a central element of donors’ 
anti-corruption efforts in developing countries, not least because article 5 of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has been interpreted to require its member states to develop 
such NACS.24 Few studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of NACS,25
                                                     
24 Whereas, in fact, the UNCAC does not require the existence of an explicit anti-corruption strategy, merely that anti-
corruption is addressed in policy, for example via integrating relevant stipulations into existing acts. 
 so claims to their 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness rest on a weak empirical foundation. The few studies that do give 
some insight into this tool are mostly part of the “grey” literature, such as working papers. A key 
obstacle to building evidence is the tendency of producing broad NACSs with little focus on 
25 While we recognize the importance of sector strategies, the limited scope of this paper meant that these could not be 
included in the review. 
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implementation or measurement of success, for example through Monitoring and Evaluation 
frameworks (Hussmann 2007). This only enables the few available qualitative case studies to 
document “experiences” and shortcomings in the design process, but not whether a NACS has had a 
positive effect.26
Nevertheless, some insights can be derived. In general, case studies suggest that most NACS fail 
because they are incomplete, poorly designed, and/or badly implemented.
 Most studies warn against a one-size-fits-all approach to NACS, showing how this 
leads to failure (McCusker 2006; Doig and Riley 1998). There are few cases where success is claimed 
but empirical data supporting this is weak (Kwok 2006).  
27
Anti-corruption laws  
 However, such studies 
often conflate the tool of NACS, coordinating and directing various anti-corruption institutions and 
reforms, with the combined efforts of these institutions and reforms. The impact of a good NACS 
should of course be to reduce corruption, but cannot be assessed independently from the external 
factors in play. Failure might be due to poor implementation, not a flawed strategy. No studies 
explored the effectiveness of NACS as a tool to coordinate and direct anti-corruption reforms, and 
whether that has an impact on corruption. It was beyond the scope of this study to assess individual 
elements of policies, but some such as staff rotation and e-government have been proven to work in 
some contexts (Abbink 2004; Andersen 2009). Overall, the evidence for this category is considered 
weak. 
UNCAC defines areas where laws should be in place to criminalize acts of corruption such as bribery, 
embezzlement, misappropriation, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, money laundering and 
obstruction of justice, witness protection, and freezing of assets.28
In general, few studies have assessed the effectiveness of anti-corruption laws to reduce corruption, 
though the existing studies offer a good mix of rigorous qualitative and quantitative work. Most of the 
studies focus on the specific area of Freedom of Information (FoI) laws rather than the criminalization 
of particular corrupt acts, arguably reflecting the prominence of the international transparency agenda. 
The existing studies highlight that in the wake of the adoption of UNCAC there has been a concerted 
effort to get anti-corruption legislation onto the statute books of developing countries (ADB/OECD 
2006), and in particular civil society organizations promoting the transparency agenda have 
documented positive experiences with regard to FoI legislation (RaaG/RTI 2008). However, it is 
unclear whether such legal changes have translated into reduced corruption. Several quantitative 
studies examine the impact of FoI legislation on corruption, but have produced contrasting results: 
while one study finds that countries adopting such laws do not become less corrupt (Tavares 2007), 
others suggest that some elements of FoI and asset declarations are associated with lower corruption 
(Mukherjee and Gokcekus 2006; Djankov et al. 2010). 
 Additional domestic laws often 
regulate issues such as access to information, conflict of interest, whistle-blower protection, political 
party financing, freedom of expression, and media freedom. 
These studies assessing cross-country data rely on International Country Risk Guide and CPI data, the 
problems of which have been discussed earlier. Furthermore, they do not clarify how causality is 
established between the introduction of a law and changes in corruption over time, and do not address 
the possibility of reverse causality. One randomized experiment from Banerjee et al. (2011) shows 
how public disclosure and provision of information reduced incidences of vote buying. Peisakhin and 
Pinto (2010) show in a randomized experiment that a FoI law can offer well-informed citizens an 
alternative to bribery. 
                                                     
26 For example, see Asamoa (2003).  
27 For example, see Hamilton-Hart (2001). 
28 UNCAC, articles 15–25. 
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Also, case studies suggest that failure has often been due to a lack of attention to actual 
implementation, lack of enforcement, and political will/ownership (World Bank 2001b; Coldham 
1995). Most other studies focus on comparing laws to “best practice,” not the effectiveness of 
individual laws.29
In sum, most studies focus on “benchmarking” existing laws to best practice standards, or are cross-
country studies with research design problems. No studies could be found which provided an impact 
assessment of an anti-corruption law. The evidence has been graded as “fair” since a handful of strong 
studies produce evidence, but this is mainly in the area of FoI. Other areas of anti-corruption laws have 
weak evidence. In some areas, such as political party financing laws, the evidence is non-existent. 
 
Financial Intelligence Units  
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) have been established as specialized units to combat money 
laundering all over the world. While they have a very specific focus on one criminal activity, they are 
part of the overall institutional framework for anti-corruption.  
Their role in, and impact on, curbing corruption has so far remained largely unexplored. The few 
existing studies limit themselves to assessing formal legislative compliance, governance arrangements, 
or a limited number of outputs, but not explicitly their impact on levels of corruption or particular 
corrupt activities (World Bank and Egmont Group 2010; Sathye and Talen 2007). A joint IMF/World 
Bank report shows a low level of formal compliance to the recommendations from the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) (IMF and World Bank 2004). Although Strauss (2010) points to the very 
low number of convictions of money launderers in his study of the Central and Eastern European 
countries and Commonwealth of Independent States region, a lack of data prevents the study from 
passing a robust judgement on the performance of FIUs. 
These limitations are compounded by data problems in the existing studies, which rely either on the 
data compiled by FIUs, or on FATF evaluation reports that do not contain sufficient information to 
assess FIU performance. No studies could be found on the FIUs’ broader role and value as part of the 
wider institutional framework to fight corruption.  
Given the very small number of studies, and the data problems they face, the strength of the evidence 
on the impact of FIUs is weak.  
Summary of evidence 
In summary, the evidence on the effectiveness of the four selected direct anti-corruption interventions 
is mostly weak. Many qualitative case studies exist, but these rarely set out to measure effectiveness in 
an objective or methodologically robust fashion. Relevant and reliable data is missing in many of the 
studies. The few quantitative studies that could be found were tangential in relevance. A lot has been 
written on ACAs but the general quality of studies was poor, often due to a lack of data. Few relevant 
studies on the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies could be found, even fewer on FIUs. There 
were a handful of strong studies relating to anti-corruption laws, but given the many types and variants 
of anti-corruption laws, they cover only a small area of a wide field (namely, FoI laws).  
                                                     
29 For example, see Mendel (2001).  
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Figure 2: Direct reforms 
 
4.2 Indirect reforms 
There are a large number of studies on indirect anti-corruption reforms in the public sector. The total 
number of potentially relevant studies for indirect reforms is substantial, but only 78 were chosen after 
review. The quality of evidence differs greatly between the different interventions examined below, 
but for most it was difficult to find even five relevant studies that could credibly account for the 
impact of a reform programme. The strong categories, like public financial management reforms, 
benefited from a combination of strong qualitative case studies, quantitative and cross-country studies, 
and donors’ own evaluations, as well as established measurement / monitoring and evaluation tools, 
which provide researchers and evaluators with the necessary data.  
Justice sector reforms 
Corruption surveys frequently identify the justice system as particularly susceptible to corruption, and 
donors have promoted a range of administrative reforms both to strengthen the technical competence 
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of the judiciary and to “corruption-proof” it.30 These efforts include reforms focusing on case 
management and allocation (both to reduce the backlog of cases and to reduce corruption in case 
selection through automated systems), on training and the appointment of judges and prosecutors, on 
developing codes of conduct, and on strengthening the capacity of judicial review bodies. The focus is 
therefore predominantly on administrative, rather than political corruption.31
There is a strong correlation between levels of corruption and the effectiveness of a country’s legal 
system (Herzfeld and Weiss 2003).
 
32
In short, the evidence on the effectiveness of technical justice sector reforms to reduce corruption is 
weak as the number of studies is low, and the focus of their inquiries fails to address the impact of 
such efforts on corruption in a rigorous manner.  
 In theory, therefore, one would expect judicial reforms to reduce 
corruption. In practice, however, few studies have documented donors’ efforts at judicial reform in an 
anti-corruption context. One large-scale evaluation of judicial reform efforts in Nigeria suggests that 
interventions have been effective in reducing bribes, but as neither a theory of change nor comparison 
groups were established, the attribution of any impact to the specific reforms is problematic (UNODC 
2010). Some of the existing studies themselves recognize the weaknesses of the existing evidence, and 
advocate more serious efforts with regard to performance monitoring and evaluation of legal and 
judicial reform efforts (Armytage 2006).  
Police reform  
Police forces are one of the major interfaces between the state and its citizens. They are central to 
establishing a state’s monopoly on violence, and to guarding and upholding property rights, and their 
performance consequently impacts on state legitimacy (Andvig and Fjelstad 2008). Unfortunately, 
corruption is widespread in many police organizations.33
There is scant evidence on the effectiveness of interventions to achieve either of these objectives. Most 
case studies are qualitative case studies, mainly documenting unsuccessful cases (Hills 2008; Baranyi 
and Erin 2011; Murray 2007; Davis 2006; di Puppo 2010).
 Donor-funded police reform programmes are 
widespread in developing countries, and often have two major corruption-related objectives: reducing 
internal police corruption (i.e., through internal investigation units and whistleblowing laws), and 
better equipping the police to fight corruption in society (i.e., by improving investigation skills or 
forensic accounting).  
34
                                                     
30 The separate role of the judiciary as an oversight mechanism to control corruption in other sectors of the state is examined 
in section 5. 
 A recent meta-evaluation of donors’ 
anti-corruption programmes stated that it had found “[…] some positive, yet still isolated, examples of 
donors effectively promoting integrity and professionalism within law enforcement agencies, starting 
with the police” (Norad 2011, 43). The evidence for this claim rests mainly on interviews and 
programme document analysis. One study used direct structured observation as a research method, and 
showed credibly that corruption in the traffic police at checkpoints entailed the cost of each trip to rise 
by 13 per cent, and that the problem could not easily be “reformed away,” for example by reducing the 
number of checkpoints (Olken and Barron 2007). The wider criminology literature and evaluations 
31 Some authors make a point that this traditional distinction is unproductive, and that technical reforms should also have a 
political component (Hammergren 2000; Santiso 2003). 
32 For an overview, see Lambsdorff (2007). 
33 Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer found an increase in the percentage of people worldwide who 
reported paying a bribe to the police from 17% in 2006 to 30% in 2010. See also Faull (2007). 
34 Positive cases are provided by Quah (2006) for the Singapore Police Force (improvement in salaries and working 
conditions supposedly led to reduced police corruption). 
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from police forces around the world suggest that police reform is a multi-dimensional problem, and 
that a culture of corruption is difficult to change.35
As most of the reviewed studies do not directly address the impact of reforms on corruption, and in 
light of the methodological limitations of many of them, the evidence of the effectiveness of police 
reform to combat corruption is judged as weak. 
  
Civil service reform  
Many civil servants have a substantial amount of discretion over the allocation of resources. 
Therefore, there are a number of entry points for anti-corruption measures to curb corruption in the 
civil service. These are corruption-prevention measures and typically include: the establishment of 
fair, transparent, merit-based, and challengeable recruitment procedures; the introduction of measures 
to enhance accountability and efficiency; and the introduction of codes of ethics or conduct to enshrine 
values of impartiality and honesty into the civil service.  
Two evaluations from the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) both show that civil service reforms have been largely ineffective,36
There is fair evidence that civil service reform overall has not been effective in reducing corruption, 
particularly for salary reform, less so for other kinds of civil service reforms. The lack of clear 
diagnostic tools to measure performance prevents more detailed evidence on what types of civil 
service reforms are more effective than others (OECD 2005).  
 and while 
these evaluations do not specifically focus on corruption, the ineffectiveness of such reforms in 
curbing corruption can be inferred from the studies. No academic studies were found which focused 
specifically on the effects of civil service reforms on reducing corruption. Most sought to explain why 
civil service reforms have failed, highlighting in particular the unwillingness of domestic elites to give 
up patronage power in the public sector (Panter 2003). A World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) evaluation states that specific focus on personnel management reform, such as merit-based 
recruitment and promotion, can counter patronage-based systems, but few well-documented cases 
exist (IEG 2003). Salary reform has been the subject of discussion for many years. While low salaries 
intuitively would force public employees to supplement their income with bribes, there is little 
evidence that pay reform is effective in curbing corruption (Lambsdorff 2007; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky 2003; van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). 
Public financial management 
Public financial management (PFM) is a broad category, which covers many different reforms. Indeed, 
reforms aimed at tax administration, revenue services, audit institutions, and procurement authorities 
all fall under the PFM sector, but have become so specialized that they are analysed separately. This 
section therefore focuses on reforms related to finance ministries and budget management. Customs 
administration, another specialized area, is not covered.  
Public financial management reforms, and in particular reforms of budget management, have benefited 
from the development of unique measurement tools. One such tool is Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys (PETS), which has been argued to be “[…] perhaps the most useful diagnostic instrument 
developed to date for evaluating the extent of corruption” (Campos and Bhargava 2007, 6). 
Essentially, such surveys track how public money flows from central ministries to front-line agencies 
                                                     
35 See for example Mollen Commission’s (1994) report on police corruption.  
36 For the OECD evaluation, see the website of the Multi-stakeholder Evaluation of Public Sector Reforms, 
http://www.psgr.org/ (World Bank 2002). See also Nickson and Lambert (2002). 
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(schools and health facilities are the most popular front-line services measured) in order to identify 
resource use and “leakage” (Reinikka and Svensson 2003, 3). By analysing the discrepancy between 
actual versus reported expenditure, reliable estimates of “leakage” can be made (Gauthier 2006). Other 
examples are the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reviews and OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee’s PFM Public Performance Measurement Framework. The data 
generated by these surveys has also enabled the production of stronger evidence for the effectiveness 
of PFM reforms. 
Budget management 
Multiple strong case studies, cross-country regression, quasi-experimental and fully experimental (i.e., 
randomized studies), including longitudinal studies, have been conducted, particularly in Africa.37 
Cross-country studies show that countries with strong budget management systems and with greater 
participation of external stakeholders in public spending (i.e., through participatory budgeting) have 
lower CPI scores (Dorotinsky and Pradhan 2007). Reinikki and Svensson’s (2001; 2004b; 2011; 
Anderson, Kaufmann, and Recanatini 2003) studies in the education and health sectors show that 
leakage of funds to decentralized services can be reduced.38
Multiple strong research studies and donor evaluations therefore show that PFM reforms can have a 
positive effect on curbing corruption, and the evidence benefits from good measurement tools. 
Overall, there is therefore strong evidence that budget management reforms can help to curb 
corruption. 
 Positive effects of participatory budgeting 
have also been documented by case studies, particularly in Brazil (Russell-Einhorn 2006; World Bank 
2004; Baiocchi 2006). While donor evaluations have focused on the effectiveness of budget 
management reforms in general, they have also noted some specific anti-corruption effects. For 
example, donor support for computerized integrated financial management systems was considered 
likely to have contributed to increased transparency in accounting, recording, and reporting 
procedures, and preventing certain types of fraud (Norad 2011). Another meta-evaluation from the 
World Bank’s IEG confirms the finding that public financial management reforms have positive anti-
corruption effects, for example by improving budget formulation to increase transparency (IEG 2003). 
There are measurement and attribution problems in both meta-evaluations, but as an indication of 
whether programmes achieve their stated objectives the evidence is solid. 
Procurement  
Government procurement is susceptible to corruption in both developed and developing countries, but 
corruption risks are greater in sectors, processes, and locations where governance and institutional 
frameworks are weak (Ware et al. 2007). Many standardized tools and handbooks describe how to 
analyse corruption risks in the procurement process flow / value chain (Heggstad and Frøystad 2011; 
OECD 2007), and cross-country studies suggest that levels of corruption and procurement systems are 
linked (Ades and Di Tella 1997; Ades and Di Tella 1999). One great advantage of studies of 
procurement reforms is that actual records can be used as data sources, and effectiveness can be 
portrayed in monetary terms, which allows for cost-benefit analysis, but such analysis is rarely done.  
Tran (2008) studies different kinds of government procurement and their anti-corruption effects by 
analysing the records of a firm that engaged in several corrupt transactions. The study finds that open 
and non-discretionary auctions reduced bribery. Di Tella and Schargrodsky show a 10 per cent 
reduction in procurement prices following increased monitoring and auditing of procurement officers 
in Buenos Aires (2003). Costs in public construction works have been documented to fall dramatically 
                                                     
37 For an overview see Gauthier (2006). 
38 For a critique see Hubbard (2007). 
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when anti-corruption investigations into procurement have been undertaken.39
Surveying Norwegian firms, Søreide (2005; 2006) finds that only six per cent of private firms consider 
procurement rules an efficient obstacle to corruption. No donor evaluations could be found which 
made use of the potential for non-perception–based data, quantification, and cost-benefit analysis. 
Rigorous evidence on electronic procurement (e-procurement), a popular reform choice, was non-
existent. Reform choices are thus still largely a “hit and miss affair” rather than a solid evidence-based 
exercise (Andvig 2011).  
 However, many of the 
documented cases are selected success stories. No studies addressing failed reforms were found.  
Even though several of the reviewed studies provide very strong evidence that procurement reforms 
can help to reduce corruption, the overall strength of the evidence is only fair, given the small number 
of studies. The limited size of the evidence also means that it does not compare the impact of different 
kinds of procurement reforms, such as e-procurement, forensic accounting, or procurement units.  
Tax and revenue authorities  
Tax and revenue services are a third important element of public financial management, and an area 
where anti-corruption reforms continue to be promoted as integral components. Reforms specifically 
targeting customs authorities have not been included in this evidence paper. 
The literature on tax and revenue administration is relatively well established, and many studies 
provide insights into what works, what doesn’t work, and why (Fjelstad 2005; Fjelstad and Tungodden 
2003). More often than in other anti-corruption areas, studies on tax and revenue services are 
academically published and peer reviewed. However, there is still a shortage of comparative and 
quantitative studies. 
The identified studies are predominantly country-case studies, and highlight in particular the local and 
contextual factors that have shaped the effectiveness of tax reforms with regard to curbing corruption, 
and do not necessarily examine on comparable reforms. Thus, one study shows how applying a 
process flow approach when reforming the Value Added Tax refund system in Bolivia reduced 
corruption (Zuleta, Leyton, and Ivanovic 2007), while another study shows how the establishment of a 
semi-autonomous tax authority in Peru led to less perceived corruption (World Bank 2001a; Taliercio 
2003). Other studies document how initial gains have not been sustainable as they pushed corruption 
into other areas, or because of continued patronage and political interference (Fjelstad 2006; Fjelstad 
2000; Das Gupta and Mookherjee 1998), that privatization of tax collection as a strategy is no 
panacea, and that one-size-fits-all institutional transplants have not been universally effective (Mann 
2004). Wider generalizations are not possible on the basis of this evidence.  
A further limitation is the quality of the data. Tax and revenue reforms often target specific, 
measurable corrupt activities such as tax evasion, however, studies do not tend to make use of cost-
benefit analysis, or use specialized surveys such as the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys (BEEPS), which have been developed. World Bank researchers have concluded 
that assessments of effectiveness of tax reform programmes are often not possible because the 
indicators and measures of effectiveness are of an unsatisfactory quality (Barbone et al. 1999). As an 
overall assessment, the evidence is fair for this category.  
                                                     
39 See for example Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999, 29).  
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Local government / decentralization 
Many anti-corruption reforms are similar regardless of whether they are applied at the local or central 
level of government, such as procurement and tax administration. In fact, most reforms require 
implementation both at the central and local government levels to work. Nevertheless there are some 
anti-corruption reforms, which are specific to local government.  
Decentralization was once heralded as a winning strategy for fighting corruption, as it would bring 
decision-making processes closer to the people, reduce the extortion capacities of central bureaucrats, 
and increase the accountability of local politicians to their constituents. The evidence from a recent 
full systematic review of anti-corruption reforms found that decentralisation may be particularly 
successful where there is local capacity and high levels of participation and community monitoring. 
On the other hand, decentralization may be an expensive and ineffective reform when implemented in 
communities that lack participation and capacity (Hanna et al. 2011; Lessmann and Markwardt 2010; 
Chavis 2010; Reinikka and Svensson 2004a; Bjorkman and Svensson 2009).40
A combination of qualitative and quantitative studies shows that decentralizing services to local 
government is not a panacea for fighting corruption. Case studies also document various contextual 
factors that influence the effectiveness of reform.
 Other strategies, such 
as New Public Management, have been documented in case studies as failing to reduce corruption at 
the sub-national level, but no general conclusions can be drawn (Tambulasi 2009). 
41
Summary of evidence 
 Decentralization can either lead to increased 
oversight by local citizens, or increased capture by local elites, depending on context. Overall, the 
evidence is not conclusive, and while individual studies are strong, the small number of studies means 
that the overall strength of the evidence is rated as fair.  
Indirect anti-corruption reforms in the public sector entail a diverse group of actions and approaches. 
The evidence for their effectiveness ranges from weak to strong. The areas with the strongest 
evidence, such as PFM reforms, benefited from established measurement tools that facilitated useful 
data, and by the fact that they often targeted service delivery corruption rather than political 
corruption. However, the majority of areas had weak evidence to support any effectiveness claims, and 
often the few available studies arrived at conflicting conclusions as to whether reforms had positive or 
negative impact. A central reason for this lack of evidence includes a lack of impact evaluations and 
research focusing on effectiveness. Even if these studies often displayed robust methods and clear 
research questions, this left only very few studies on the basis of which an assessment of the quality 
and strength of the overall evidence for the impact of a particular intervention could be made.  
                                                     
40 See also Fisman and Gatti (2002) for positive evidence on fiscal decentralization, based on cross-country regression 
analysis. 
41 See for example Asthana (2008) and Kohl (2003). 
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Figure 3: Indirect reforms 
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5. Oversight institutions 
Oversight institutions, such as supreme audit institutions (SAIs), parliament, ombudsperson, and 
courts are non-executive bodies that are mandated to ensure horizontal accountability of the executive 
in particular. This mandate, in theory, enables them to hold government accountable for its 
performance and use of resources. In performing this mandate, oversight institutions should have the 
potential to play an effective role in reducing corruption. 
Several quantitative studies examine the effectiveness of SAIs in reducing corruption, providing the 
strongest evidence base for the institutions covered under this section. There was fair evidence on the 
importance of an independent judiciary to the fight against corruption, but few studies assessing donor 
support to strengthen judicial independence. This may reflect the fact that support for judicial reform 
has tended to focus on the strengthening of the capacity of courts (discussed earlier in section 4). 
The evidence search yielded no relevant studies dealing directly with the role of ombudspersons or 
parliaments in reducing corruption. For ombudsperson offices, a small number of case studies were 
identified, whereas evidence on the role of parliaments was largely limited to the meta-studies 
identified earlier in this study, and a World Bank evaluation. This may reflect that the understanding 
of the potential role of these institutions in the fight against corruption is still evolving. 
5.1 Supreme audit institutions 
SAIs perform an important oversight role, particularly in relation to the use of public funds. They 
typically report to parliament, but may also report to the supreme court, or an audit board. Their role is 
to check government accounts through audits in order to ensure the proper and effective use of public 
funds, the proper execution of administrative activities, the development of sound financial 
management, and the communication of information to public authorities and the general public 
through the publication of reports (DFID 2005). 
A 2011 Joint Evaluation of Donor Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts found that compared to support 
to other institutions involved in anti-corruption, such as ACAs, support to SAIs was considered to 
have been highly effective (Norad 2011). By contrast, the research literature examined mostly contest 
such a positive assessment and highlight a range of obstacles to a corruption-reducing impact of SAIs. 
These include: 
• Structural factors linked to the political economy of government auditing, in particular the 
dysfunctional linkages between government auditing, legislative oversight, and judicial 
control (Santiso 2006); 
• Executive interference into the auditing process (Wang and Rakner 2005); and 
• Consistent underfunding of audit institutions (Migliorisi and Wescott 2011).  
This is confirmed by several larger comparative studies. Migliorisi and Wescott (2011) find that, in 
more cases than not, the effectiveness of SAIs (from a sample of 37 countries) receiving World Bank 
support had decreased in the time period covered—although the authors do not attempt to address the 
issue of what might have caused the decrease in effectiveness.  Blume and Voigt (2007; 2011), in a 
cross-country assessment are unable to find a clear-cut effect of SAIs on any of their dependent 
variables: fiscal policy, government effectiveness, or productivity. 
The obstacles to SAIs’ effectiveness identified in the reviewed studies highlight the importance of the 
wider institutional context for the corruption-reducing impact of SAIs.  Even the most detailed and 
robust audit reports are unlikely to have much effect without effective parliamentary budgetary 
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oversight and scrutiny by parliament, and the ability to hold spending ministries to account (Dye and 
Stapenhurst 1998). Similarly, the relationship of SAIs with internal audit bodies within spending 
ministries and departments, and the capacity of these audit bodies need to be taken into consideration 
when evaluating SAIs’ effectiveness (see section 4 on public financial management) (Wescott 2008). 
While the evidence search focused on audit institutions, several studies found government-led audits 
(together with non-financial incentives) to be an effective tool in reducing corruption in various fields, 
not only budget oversight.42
While high hopes have been placed on SAIs, and some donor evaluations arrive at favourable 
conclusions, there is also evidence that donor support to SAIs has been ineffective and that SAIs 
themselves may not have the expected impact on reducing levels of corruption. This evidence is 
relatively strong. It is however not conclusive as to the effectiveness of SAIs in reducing corruption.  
 It is however argued that this impact may decrease over time or cause 
other forms of corruption to increase (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; Olken 2007; and Brollo 
2009). Based on this evidence, Hanna et al. conclude that “additional research is required in order to 
evaluate whether these strategies can be successful in the long term” (2011, 33). 
5.2 Parliament 
Parliament typically has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. 
SAIs, ombudspersons, and ACAs often report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their 
independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability 
institutions. At the same time, parliaments can also play a key role in promoting accountability, 
through constituency outreach, public hearings, and parliamentary commissions (Stapenhurst, 
Johnston, and Pellizo 2006). 
The evidence search did not yield sufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of 
parliaments in reducing corruption. Hudson and Tsekpo state that: 
[…] there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or 
about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those 
considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-
informed decisions. (2009, v)  
Parliaments have an important role to play vis-à-vis SAIs, in particular through their public accounts 
and budget committees. For example, the Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts found 
that support bringing together SAI and parliament in Tanzania has strengthened their ability to hold 
the executive accountable (Norad 2011). A pair of comparative cross-country studies however found 
that parliaments in recipient countries have not been effective in performing their budget oversight 
role (Santiso 2004; Wang and Rakner 2005; de Renzio 2006). This is in part explained by lack of 
capacity and information asymmetries. But these studies also argued that parliaments’ ineffectiveness 
in budget oversight may result from potentially high levels of politicization of the legislature leading 
to unconstructive interference in the budget process (Santiso 2004; Wang and Rakner 2005; de Renzio 
2006). 
Based on the evidence search, the evidence on the effectiveness of parliaments in reducing corruption 
is considered to be weak. 
                                                     
42 See for example Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Olken (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008), and Brollo (2009). 
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5.3 Ombudsperson 
While an ombudsperson or ombudsperson’s office may have varying functions, they typically 
represent the interests of the public by investigating and addressing complaints reported by 
individuals. The ombudsperson is usually appointed by government or parliament but often has a 
significant degree of independence. Ombudspersons however typically do not have a specific anti-
corruption mandate, but rather focus on human rights issues. 
As noted by Migliorisi and Wescott (2011) there are very limited studies on donor support to 
ombudspersons and related bodies. The few studies that were identified found the ombudspersons to 
be ineffective, typically due to lack of independence, funds, and capacity (Sherlock 2002; Piron and 
O’Neil 2005; Andreassen and Oftedal 2007). As the evidence is primarily composed of case studies 
that generally do not address the role of ombudspersons in the fight against corruption, it is considered 
to be weak. 
5.4 Judicial independence 
The judiciary is generally recognized as having a critical role to play in punishing corrupt acts and 
contributing to the prevention of further corruption through deterrence. Ultimately, it is through the 
courts that criminal convictions for corruption offences can be secured. An independent and well-
functioning judiciary is therefore fundamental to effectively tackling corruption (USAID 2002; 
Herzfeld and Weiss 2003; Mendelski 2010; Dakolias and Thachuk 2000). 
The evidence for the contribution of judicial reform programmes to securing judicial independence, 
however, is rather weak. The number of studies examining such interventions that have been identified 
by the evidence search is low. Furthermore, what the evidence does suggest is that judicial reforms 
have focused more on strengthening judicial capacity (discussed in more detail in section 4), rather 
than on supporting judicial independence (Norad 2011).  
The literature suggests that support to judicial reform has not achieved the expected results. Carothers 
for example argues that a lack of a well-grounded rationale, clear understanding of the problem, 
proven analytic method, or understanding of the results achieved continues to exist after 30 years of 
activity in this field. Upham in turn argues that support to judicial reform continues without a carefully 
elaborated model of law and development based on empirical evidence (Upham 2006; Carothers 2006; 
Armytage 2009). 
Hammergren (2000) and Santiso (2003) also argue that there may be a trade-off between judicial 
integrity and judicial independence, with Hammergren stating that “extreme judicial independence can 
produce its own set of vices, one of which may well be new forms of corruption” (2000, 14). 
Based on the evidence search, there is fair evidence for the importance of the effectiveness and 
independence of the judiciary in the fight against corruption (Dakolias and Thachuk 2000; Herzfeld 
and Weiss 2003; Mendelski 2010). There is however weak evidence on successful efforts of 
development partners in supporting the development of judicial independence. 
5.5 Summary of evidence 
While the evidence search largely provides a common view that oversight institutions and horizontal 
accountability are essential to the fight against corruption, there is generally a lack of evidence, or 
contradictory findings on the effectiveness of these institutions in reducing corruption. It also appears 
that this is an area that has been neglected both in terms of support from development partners as well 
as academic research. 
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Figure 4: Oversight institutions  
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6. Civil society 
Internationally, civil society has played an important role in advancing the anti-corruption agenda. 
Non-governmental organizations like Transparency International, the Revenue Watch Institute, or 
Global Witness have been central to exposing corruption, advocating legal changes to fight corruption, 
and pushing for greater transparency in governments and businesses to prevent it. Donors have also 
supported a wide range of civil society actors—such as non-governmental and civil society 
organizations, media organizations, and professional and business associations—to strengthen their 
role and effectiveness in the fight against corruption in developing countries.  
The literature identifies several ways in which civil society activities are supposed to reduce 
corruption by increasing transparency to facilitate greater accountability of public bodies, through 
advocacy for legislative changes and for public sector reforms that can help to reduce corruption, and 
through raising awareness of corrupt conduct.  
First, by increasing transparency and strengthening social accountability (i.e., through monitoring 
efforts), civil society support is expected to reduce corruption. Social accountability aims to enable 
citizens to hold public institutions accountable through mechanisms other than the traditional vertical 
channels (elections) and horizontal channels (legislatures, courts, and institutional checks and 
balances) of formal political accountability. This can involve a wide range of mechanisms, including 
formal involvement of civil society in participatory budgeting processes, involvement in public 
expenditure tracking, monitoring public service delivery, or establishing public commissions and 
citizen advisory boards (Malena, Forster, and Singh 2004). What all these mechanisms have in 
common is their aim of increasing the publicly available information about financial flows and 
administrative decisions, facilitating the ability of citizens to hold public bodies to account, and deter 
corruption.  
Second, civil society support aims at reducing corruption through strengthening the ability of civil 
society actors to influence public policy and resource allocation decisions through advocacy efforts. 
Such efforts are often aimed at bringing about institutional and legislative change for greater 
accountability and transparency, in particular in relation to the allocation and use of public money. 
Third, civil society is expected to contribute to a reduction in corruption by raising awareness of 
corrupt conduct. Greater awareness can increase the cost of corruption to those engaging in it—not 
only the reputational cost, but also financially or in terms of one’s liberty—if greater awareness leads 
to prosecutions of corrupt actors. In addition, greater awareness can help to mobilize public support for 
anti-corruption efforts. While raising awareness with regard to corruption was the main focus of 
donors in the 1990s (Bryane 2007), it is now generally considered part of a broader “holistic” 
approach to the fight against corruption—in particular as part of broad-based, national anti-corruption 
strategies.43
The evidence search identified more than 120 potential studies of which 38 were considered to be 
relevant. Large-n studies were found on the relationship between media and corruption, and the search 
on social accountability yielded a number of comparative qualitative studies and multi-country 
evaluations. Beyond this, the evidence available primarily covered country or sub-national case 
studies, with focus primarily of success stories which somewhat limits the possibility of distilling 
context-specific conclusions on what does and does not work in the area of civil society support. 
 
                                                     
43 See for example McCusker (2006). 
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As studies tend to focus more on the particular civil society actors that have been supported, rather 
than particular activities, the evaluation of the evidence for civil society support is organized according 
to the three main types of actors supported: non-governmental and community organizations; the 
media; and business and professional organizations. All of these can engage in one or more of the 
corruption-reducing activities identified above.  
Non-governmental organizations and community monitoring mechanisms 
In this area, most studies fall into two broad categories: those examining support for dedicated anti-
corruption non-governmental organizations (NGOs) / civil society organizations (CSOs), and studies 
on community monitoring mechanisms.  
Dedicated anti-corruption NGOs/CSOs that engage in monitoring, raising awareness, and advocacy 
have received increased donor attention in recent years, but their efforts have only recently been 
subject to critical assessment (Disch, Vigeland, and Sundet 2009). As a consequence, the available 
evidence is rather limited: the search only identified two studies specifically assessing the 
effectiveness of national NGOs/CSOs in addressing corruption. While a joint donor evaluation on anti-
corruption support found that “[d]onor support for CSOs was … deemed largely effective” (Norad 
2011),44
• The lack of political will on the part of governments to engage with citizens and NGOs/CSOs 
(Arroyo and Sirker 2005); 
 most other studies that were identified generally argue that anti-corruption NGOs/CSOs (and 
donor support to them) have not contributed to a reduction in corruption. The studies identify several 
reasons for the limited impact of NGOs/CSOs: 
• Inadequate legal frameworks (freedom of information legislation, etc.) and institutional 
frameworks, primarily in terms of horizontal accountability mechanisms (Grimes 2008); 
• A lack of representativeness on the part of the NGOs/CSOs (Tisne and Smilov 2004; Ezeoha 
2006); and  
• Effective partnerships between local NGOs/CSOs and donors aimed at strengthening 
NGO/CSO capacity are limited by the reporting requirements placed on them by donors 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2004).45
The lack of comparative analysis and the small number of studies however means that these findings 
cannot be confidently generalized. The conclusion of these studies specifically focused on anti-
corruption (namely, that NGOS/CSOs have had no impact) is also indirectly contested in two ways. 
First, a number of studies, not directly addressing the role of NGOs/CSOs in fighting corruption, 
shows that NGO/CSOs have at times played a critical role in promoting change, strengthening 
accountability, and serving as intermediaries between the public / people’s organizations and 
governments (in particular in relation to social accountability) (Grimes 2008; Arroyo and Sirker 2005; 
Hanna et al. 2011).  Second, several case studies have examined the contributions that NGOs/CSOs 
have made to the fight against corruption.
  
46
One specific form of civil society anti-corruption work that is most strongly, though not exclusively, 
associated with NGOs/CSOs is advocacy. While the evidence search identified a range of case studies 
of successful anti-corruption advocacy campaigns from countries like India or Uganda (mostly in the 
  
                                                     
44 The evaluation, however, fails to explicitly outline how NGOs/CSOs have directly contributed to any reduction in 
corruption. 
45 It should be noted that this study focuses on international NGOs, but it can be assumed that the same issues arise at the 
national level. 
46 See for example Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (forthcoming) and Knox (2009). 
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grey literature) (Baviskar 2008; Jenkins 2007; Baker 2008), it found no quantitative or comparative 
studies explicitly addressing anti-corruption advocacy. There is stronger evidence on the effectiveness 
of certain subsets of advocacy, for example on budget transparency, which is closely linked to anti-
corruption efforts.47
The evidence for social accountability mechanisms, in particular community monitoring, is more 
substantial, with a range of qualitative (Arroyo and Sirker 2005; McNeil and Mumvuma 2006; 
Gaventa and Barrett 2010) and micro-level studies (Ravindra 2004; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; 
Björkman and Svensson 2009; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan forthcoming)—however, there is a noted lack 
of comparative and large-n studies.
 Also, while not directly assessing the impact of advocacy on corruption, several 
studies find that advocacy has the potential to increase the effectiveness of other anti-corruption 
interventions, for example social accountability initiatives (McGee and Gaventa 2010; Arroyo and 
Sirker 2005).  
48 The existing evidence mostly suggests that transparency and 
accountability initiatives (including social accountability) can contribute to increased state or 
institutional responsiveness, lowering corruption, building new democratic spaces for citizen 
engagement, empowering local voices, better utilizing the budget, and better delivering services.49
The reviewed studies highlight two more findings. First, monitoring itself has little effect on 
corruption. Only if it is coupled with clear sanctions—i.e., the ability to remove officials from office 
through elections, or withholding budgetary resources—can community-level monitoring contribute to 
reductions in corruption (Hanna et al. 2011; Olken 2007; Hubbard 2007). Second, the studies also 
indicate that certain conditions are critical for the success of social accountability mechanisms. These 
include formalized institutional arrangements for horizontal accountability, transparency enhancing 
legislation, and participatory governance arrangements; an enabling environment, including media and 
political will; and strong civil society organizations and networks.
 
50
The overall quality of the evidence for the role of NGOs/CSOs and social accountability mechanisms 
is therefore fair—a substantial number of studies exists (though skewed towards social accountability 
mechanisms), and while much of it is based on single country cases, there is use of in-country 
comparison and of randomized controlled trials that strengthens the findings. However, the quality of 
the evidence is limited by the fact that studies using similar methods come to conflicting 
conclusions.
 
51
Media 
 Two recent studies also stress that current tools for assessing the impact of social 
accountability mechanisms may not be suitable for identifying impact, in part due to the complicated 
relationships among citizens, policymakers, programme managers, and service providers, and the fact 
that no single intervention on its own is likely to result in change (Ringhold et al. 2011; Tembo 2012). 
A free media is often seen as critical in promoting good governance and controlling corruption through 
raising public awareness about corruption, its causes, consequences and possible remedies, as well as 
investigating and reporting on incidences of corruption. It is also considered as an important 
facilitating factor strengthening other anti-corruption interventions, such as social accountability 
mechanisms, by providing a channel through which criticisms can be voiced and accountability can be 
exercised (Arroyo and Sirker 2005; Hanna et al. 2011; Grimes 2008). 
                                                     
47 See Robinson (2006), which is based on case studies from six countries. 
48 See also McGee and Gaventa (2010). 
49 For a more critical view, see Veron et al. (2006). 
50 See also Rose-Ackermann (2007), Grimes (2008), and Development Research Center (2011).  
51 See for example Björkman and Svensson (2009) and Olken (2007). 
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The evidence search yielded five studies that provide strong evidence that there is a clear correlation 
between increased press freedom and lower levels of corruption, based on a number of multivariate 
regressions52
The evidence search identified no studies examining dedicated public awareness raising campaigns. 
The studies identified that covered awareness-raising together with other interventions were either 
theoretical (not providing sufficient empirical evidence) or addressing awareness-raising at the global 
rather than at the national or sub-national level. There appears to be little systematic empirical analysis 
of the effectiveness of awareness-raising in reducing corruption, and even studies taking a favourable 
view of awareness-raising campaigns acknowledge that they are unable to identify any actual impact 
on levels of corruption (McCoy and Heckel 2001; Grigirescu 2006). Some studies even identify risks 
of negative consequences of awareness-raising campaigns: when not followed by actual results they 
are likely to result in disillusionment and cynicism among the public (Bryane 2007; Disch, Vigeland, 
and Sundet 2009). 
 and a broad spectrum of countries (Stapenhurst 2000; Brunetti and Weder 2003; 
Chowdhury 2004; Freille, Haq, and Kneller 2007; Lambsdorff 2006). This general finding is partially 
qualified by studies that suggest that press freedom alone is insufficient to reduce corruption, and 
needs to be complemented by real reputational or personal cost to the individual as a result of 
sanctions arising from the reporting of corrupt activities (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005). The evidence 
reviewed also suggests that political and economic influences on media constitute a greater obstacle to 
its effectiveness than does the absence of an enabling legal framework for press freedom (Freille, Haq, 
and Kneller 2007). 
While there is strong evidence that press freedom does lead to a reduction in corruption and donors do 
invest in media as part of their support to civil society (although support to civil society as a whole is 
dwarfed by support to the public sector), the search identified little evidence (with the partial 
exception of Freille, Haq, and Kneller [2007], who identify the absence of economic and political 
influence to be most conducive to the development of an effective media) on what the most effective 
ways to strengthen a free media as part of civil society support are. 
Private sector and business associations 
The potentially important role that the private sector has to play in the fight against corruption is 
recognized in the United Nations Convention against Corruption as well as initiatives such as the 
Global Compact. This is also recognized in several studies identified through the evidence search.53
While a range of studies focus on private sector corruption and the effects of corruption on the 
business environment, the evidence base for the roles it can play in reducing corruption at the national 
level and the effectiveness of such efforts is weak. The ways in which private sector actors and 
business and professional associations are thought to be able to contribute to a reduction in corruption 
include advocating for reforms of tax codes and eliminating red tape, and the development and 
promotion (i.e., through education) of professional and ethical standards (Weimar 2007; Sullivan and 
Shkolnikov 2008; Centre for International and Private Enterprises 2010). Business associations in 
Africa, for example, have at times effectively advocated for better governance (Goldsmith 2002), and 
integrity pacts appear to have had positive results in reducing corruption in public procurement 
(Boehm and Olaya 2006; Transparency International 2002). 
 
Yet despite the examples given above, there is weak evidence as to the effectiveness of the private 
sector, business associations, and professional associations in reducing corruption. This seems to 
                                                     
52 A regression is a statistical analysis assessing the association between two variables. Multivariate regression is a technique 
used to estimate a single regression model with more than one outcome variable. 
53 See for example Transparency International (2009) and Weimer (2007). 
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reflect the limited attention that donors have paid to such organizations in the context of their civil 
society support (Norad 2011). 
6.1 Summary of evidence 
The strength of the evidence with regard to civil society support is mixed. While there is strong 
evidence for a close correlation between media freedom and lower corruption, there is only weak 
evidence with regard to the kind of interventions that might successfully encourage and protect a free 
media. Despite a substantial number of studies on the role of NGOs/CSOs and community monitoring, 
the overall strength of the evidence is only fair, given methodological weaknesses and conflicting 
conclusions. Across the studies on civil society’s role in reducing corruption, there is very little 
rigorous evidence on awareness raising interventions, on advocacy, and the role of private sector 
actors and associations. 
 
Figure 5: Civil society 
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7. Direct budget support 
Direct budget support, where aid is disbursed through the financial management systems of the 
recipient government, and which is either not earmarked for a specific purpose (general budget 
support) or given to support a particular sector (sector budget support), has been growing in 
prominence over the last two decades. According to OECD data, general budget support (excluding 
sector budget support) increased from US$2.9 billion in 2006 to US$3.45 billion in 2010.54
The primary rationale for direct budget support is not the reduction of corruption.
 
55
Budget support has been suggested to contribute to a reduction in corruption in two ways in particular: 
by strengthening budgetary processes, and by providing incentives for greater accountability. 
 Nevertheless, the 
discretion it grants recipient governments with regard to aid funds has sometimes been associated with 
a greater corruption risk. However, the evidence for this is contested: a detailed evaluation of general 
budget support in 2006 found that there was no clear evidence for a greater risk to corruption in budget 
support compared to other forms of aid (IDD 2006; Kolstad, Fritz, and O’Neill 2008). 
Direct budget support is said to contribute to a strengthening of public financial management (PFM) in 
several ways:56
• Disbursing aid through government systems focuses the attention of both governments and 
donors on strengthening PFM systems, and on strengthening and rationalizing technical 
assistance to strengthen them; 
 
• Directing resources through the budget and government systems focuses the attention of 
ministries and agencies on the budgeting process, rather than on dealing directly with donors; 
and 
• It contributes to a greater emphasis on transparency in the budgeting process, a pre-condition 
for greater accountability. 
The anti-corruption effect of direct budget support is thus expected to come from both the incentives 
that it provides to governments and donors to strengthen budget processes, and from the additional 
technical assistance devoted to this. 
The second way in which direct budget support is considered to address corruption is through 
providing incentives for greater parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. This, it is argued, reduces 
the opportunities for corruption.57
• Greater amounts of aid money going through the budget subjects more expenditure to 
parliamentary scrutiny. It is also argued that it gives representatives a greater incentive to 
deliver benefits to engage with the budgetary process as this delivers public goods to their 
constituents, rather than lobbying donors for projects in their constituencies directly; 
 
                                                     
54 According to OECD statistics, accessed on 6 March 2012. Total budget support in 2010, the first year where sector budget 
support is included in the data, was approximately US$7.25 billion. 
55 The main rationales for direct budget support are reduced transaction costs and the strengthening of a recipient country’s 
own systems and institutions. See Koeberle, Stacreski, and Walliser (2006). 
56 See for example IDD (2006) and Shand (2006). 
57 For an overview on the literature on parliaments’ role of budget scrutiny as an anti-corruption function, see Joachim 
(2006). 
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• Direct budget support strengthens dialogue around the making of the budget, and increases 
incentives for scrutiny; 
• Stronger and more transparent budgetary processes enable more effective scrutiny.  
The literature on, and evaluations of, direct budget support generally do not primarily focus on its anti-
corruption effects. To the extent that corruption is discussed, the focus is mostly on the danger of 
budget support fuelling corruption, on direct budget support’s impact on public financial management, 
or on establishing greater transparency and accountability (especially through parliamentary scrutiny). 
The evidence reviewed does not address the issue of whether better PFM, transparency, and 
accountability actually reduce corruption.  
The evidence search yielded a total of 23 potentially relevant studies. Of these, 7 were excluded after 
further analysis as they either did not address the research questions, or merely summarized other 
studies evaluated in this paper.  
Strengthening budgetary processes and systems 
The studies, based mostly on detailed qualitative evaluations and case studies, provide no direct 
evidence that direct budget support has contributed to a reduction in corruption, and limited evidence 
that it strengthens PFM outcomes, but not necessarily PFM systems (IDD 2006; Daima Associates and 
Overseas Development Institute 2005; Shand 2006; Williamson 2006).58 Evidence that the link 
between direct budget support and the rationalization and strengthening of technical assistance for 
PFM systems is overstated further support the claim. Several evaluation studies find either a mixed 
picture across countries (IDD 2006, 58), or across different part of the government system (as in 
Tanzania) (IDD 2006, 57), or suggest that such support is poorly targeted (European Court of Auditors 
2010).59
The overall strength of the evidence is limited by: first, the contested nature of some of the findings; 
and second, the fact that most of the evidence is based on evaluations of single or a small number of 
cases—there is no cross-country quantitative analysis that could further support the findings. The case 
study approach, however, offers further insights into the ways in which direct budget support 
strengthens PFM systems.  
 On the other hand, there is fair evidence that direct budget support has contributed to greater 
transparency in the budgetary process (IDD 2006; Alonso, Judge, and Klugman 2006). 
A more profound limitation is that none of the studies attempts to directly link this to reductions of 
corruption, and provide no direct evidence for the impact of direct budget support on corruption. With 
regard to the overarching research question, the evidence is therefore weak.  
Greater parliamentary scrutiny and accountability 
There is fair evidence that direct budget support is not strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and 
accountability. The key evaluations of budget support either give no evidence on this issue (IDD 
2006), or explicitly state that there is no positive impact (Daima Associates and Overseas 
Development Institute 2005). Other studies argue that the resources and technical assistance associated 
with budget support can strengthen the executive (at whom much of this assistance is targeted) vis-à-
vis accountability institutions like parliaments (Kolstad, Fritz, and O’Neill 2005; USAID 2005). 
                                                     
58 Two studies in particular contest the positive impact on PFM: European Court of Auditors (2010) and Brooke (2003). 
59 A PEFA study examining technical support to strengthen PFM in the context of budget support (though relying strongly on 
interviewee perceptions rather than hard data) similarly concludes that such assistance remains fragmented and is not 
rationalized by the pressures of direct budget support (Brooke 2003).  
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7.1 Summary of evidence 
Overall, the evidence for direct budget support reducing corruption is weak. Most of the evidence is 
methodologically strong, but most of it does not primarily focus on corruption; rather, they focus on 
other effects of budget support. The evidence for an indirect effect is weakened by the lack of an 
explicit assessment in the evidence of the impact in particular on PFM systems and processes. Where 
evidence is stronger, it suggests that the impact on scrutiny and accountability—and by extension 
corruption—is weak at best. 
Figure 6: Direct budget support 
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8. Donors’ own systems 
Through their own systems of allocating and managing aid, donors can aim to control and reduce 
corruption, both to protect against losses in their own programmes and to reduce corruption in 
recipient countries. Unlike the other dedicated anti-corruption actions and approaches examined in this 
paper, the use of donors’ own systems thus has a dual purpose with regard to anti-corruption.  
The literature identifies three main ways in which donors can protect their aid against corruption:  
• By taking corruption risks into account in their aid allocation decisions (i.e., by applying 
corruption-related conditionality);  
• By taking corruptions risks into account in the choice of aid modalities; and 
• By using internal processes, such as audits or evaluations, to reduce corruption risks, and 
increase the likelihood of detecting and prosecuting corrupt activities, thereby increasing the 
opportunity cost of corruption.  
As the impact of different aid modalities on corruption is already examined in the context of direct 
budget support (see Section 7), the discussion below focuses on aid allocation decisions and the use of 
donors’ internal processes. 
Taking corruption risks into account in aid allocation decisions can affect corruption in two ways. 
First, it redirects aid from highly corrupt to less corrupt countries, and is therefore likely to reduce 
losses from corruption. Second, the loss of aid can provide an incentive for corrupt countries to 
strengthen their anti-corruption efforts.  
Related to this, taking into account likely negative impacts of aid on the political economy of recipient 
countries (i.e., by fuelling corruption and entrenching existing hierarchical structures)60
The use of internal processes like audits, evaluations, or investigations can reduce corruption by 
increasing the opportunity cost of corruption (as detection and sanctioning become more likely), and 
possibly by deterring future corruption for these reasons.  
 when making 
decisions on both aid allocation and aid modalities can be expected to reduce corruption or at least 
contain some of its wider consequences.  
One specific anti-corruption claim relates to the effect of donor transparency on corruption in recipient 
countries. Thus, it is argued that greater donor transparency enables beneficiaries, civil society, and 
institutions like parliaments to scrutinize both donor portfolios and government spending of this aid 
(Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Christiansen et al. 2011). 
The evidence search identified 23 potentially relevant studies, of which 4 were later excluded, as they 
did not address the research question.61
                                                     
60 See Section 3.  
 Of the remaining 19, 5 addressed issues of aid allocation, 
while a further 3 examined the assessments of corruption risks and political economy analysis. Three 
studies also examined the role of evaluation. None were found that addressed issues of quality 
assurance or due diligence. 
61 See the search protocol for details on the evidence search. 
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8.1 Using corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions 
The review of the evidence suggests that high levels of corruption is of little consequence for the 
allocation of aid, and that most donors do not take corruption levels into account in their decisions to 
allocate aid. This evidence comes primarily from several large-n analyses of the relationship between 
levels of aid and levels of corruption (Alesina and Weder 1999; Easterley and Pfutze 2008; 
Svensson 2000). This finding is supported by qualitative research suggesting that donors like the 
World Bank have turned a blind eye to corruption in countries like Mozambique because the 
government implemented the prescribed reform programmes, and because continued GDP growth 
made it look like a development success story (Hanlon 2004). Evaluations of World Bank practices 
also point to the inconsistent application of political economy analysis and responsiveness to 
Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) issues (IEG 2009; IEG 2011; Quality Assurance Group 
2009). 
However, there are several important limitations of this evidence: 
• None of the studies examining the relationship between corruption and allocation of aid also 
examine whether withholding or withdrawing aid might contribute to a reduction in 
corruption.  
• Most of the data analysed in the quantitative studies is from the 1990s or early 2000s, and 
some of it merely correlates corruption and aid allocation data with only limited further 
analysis of possible reasons for this correlation. 
• The quantitative studies only look at overall aid allocations, and do not look at different 
sectors. Qualitative evidence from an evaluation of anti-corruption efforts of several bilateral 
aid programmes from 2002 to 2009 highlights how some donors have selectively withdrawn 
from particular sectors with high corruption risks, often in response to corruption problems 
(Norad 2011). 
• With regard to the qualitative evidence, a severe limitation is its focus on the World Bank, as 
almost no comparable work evaluating the practices of other donors was identified by the 
search.62
In light of these limitations, the evidence can only be regarded as fair.  
  
8.2 Donors’ internal processes  
The evidence on internal processes to reduce corruption identified by the search broadly falls into four 
categories: the evaluation of donor efforts to protect their aid against corruption, the role of risk 
assessments, the role of project evaluation, and the role of audits. Overall, the evidence base is weak, 
because of both the small number of studies and their focus (with the partial exception of the literature 
on evaluations). 
First, the evidence from evaluations of donor performance in protecting their aid against corruption is 
mixed, which is unsurprising, as much of it is donor- (or even programme-) specific. What is notable, 
however, is first, the low number of dedicated anti-corruption evaluations that were identified by the 
search,63
                                                     
62 A partial exception is the Norad study mentioned above, but it devotes very little attention to the issue of aid allocation.  
 and second the distinction between quite sanguine and positive evaluations of bilateral 
programmes, and more critical evaluations of World Bank efforts. Moreover, the evaluations seem to 
63 The search identified four evaluations: ICAI (2011), IEG (2011), Norad (2011), and World Bank (2007). A search of the 
OECD’s EvalNet did not yield any further dedicated anti-corruption evaluations.  
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make assumptions about the effectiveness of particular anti-corruption interventions (such as audits or 
assessments of corruption risks)—assumptions that are likely to be justified—but do not examine the 
effectiveness of different types of interventions. As a result, they offer only few insights into what 
works and what does not. 
Second, the evidence of the impact of fiduciary risk assessments on reducing corruption is very 
limited. While a range of studies examine the use of fiduciary risk assessments, they do not examine 
whether it is effective or not, but only the extent and consistency of its application.64 Only one study 
was identified that actually examines the effectiveness of a particular risk assessment process (“red 
flags”) (Kenny and Musatova 2010), and it suggests that the “red flags” indicators used in World Bank 
projects to identify corruption risks are problematic especially as particular “red flags” can have 
multiple causes and do not necessarily indicate corruption. The study’s methodological limitations,65
Third, the studies that examine the effectiveness of general project evaluations tend not to focus 
specifically on anti-corruption impacts, but on examining the overall effectiveness of aid projects. All 
four studies find the effectiveness of evaluations to be limited (Borrmann and Michaelowa 2006; 
Clements, Chianca, and Sasaki 2008; Liverani and Lundgren 2007; World Bank 2007), though 
the reasons for this are only explored in three of them (Borrmann and Michaelowa 2006; Clements, 
Chianca, and Sasaki 2008; Liverani and Lundgren 2007). All of them point to the danger of positive 
bias because of a lack of independent evaluations. This suggests that evaluations that are not 
independent are of limited use as an instrument for identifying corruption risks and vulnerabilities, and 
thus for reducing corruption. 
 
as the authors themselves acknowledge, however, mean that it highlights the need for refinement of 
the red flag methodology as applied by the World Bank, rather than making a generalizable criticism 
of this process.  
Finally, only a single study identified in the evidence search examined the role of audits of aid 
programmes as an instrument to reduce corruption (Hobbs 2005). It highlights that the cost of 
comprehensive audits in every project would exceed the savings from such efforts, thus focusing on 
the viability of comprehensive audits, rather than their effectiveness in reducing corruption.  
8.3 Summary of evidence 
Overall, the evidence for the impact of donors’ internal processes on reducing corruption is weak: the 
number of studies examining individual processes is small, and generally they do not focus on the 
actual effectiveness of the process, but on its consistent application.66
                                                     
64 See for example Norad (2011) and Quality Assurance Group (2009). A 2003 paper published by U4 on the internal anti-
corruption architecture in the Utstein country development agencies merely describes the relevant legal and institutional 
structures, but does not evaluate their impact. See Mathisen (2003). 
 Most of the studies are 
methodologically rigorous and transparent, giving confidence into the robustness of their findings to 
the extent that they are relevant to the questions examined here.  
65 A particular limitation is the number and selection of case studies. See Kenny and Musatova (2010, 5). 
66 However, given that the evidence for the role of audits in reducing corruption is strong (see section 5), it could be argued 
that if this evidence is also taken into account the evidence for the impact of what kind of anti-corruption interventions in the 
context of donors’ own efforts to manage their aid is stronger than the grading rules used in this paper suggest.  
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Figure 7: Donors’ own systems 
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9. Multilateral agreements on anti-corruption standards 
Over the last 25 years, a range of multilateral agreements to fight and reduce corruption have been 
reached, involving states, international organizations, and a range of non-state actors, such as 
multinational companies in the extractive industries sector and civil society groups. These agreements 
aim to address corruption in three ways: first, by overcoming collective action problems that might 
limit cooperation in efforts to reduce corruption; second, by developing and codifying anti-corruption 
norms internationally; and third, by promoting and entrenching these anti-corruption norms in 
domestic societies. The four key international agreements with regard to anti-corruption are:  
• The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) established in 1989 to combat money laundering;  
• The 2002 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to improve transparency and 
reduce corruption in resource-rich countries;  
• The 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the principal global anti-
corruption treaty establishing a range of mandatory obligations and voluntary measures for 
states to take to fight corruption;  
• The 2007 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) of the World Bank and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  
This section will begin by briefly outlining the three causal pathways through which multilateral 
agreements are expected to address corruption, and then examine the evidence for the effectiveness of 
these pathways.   
9.1 How are multilateral agreements expected to reduce corruption? 
The literature on international institutions identifies three causal pathways in particular through which 
institutions shape state behaviour in general, and can contribute to reducing corruption: first, 
facilitating cooperation between states; second, codifying and consolidating international norms and 
increasing reputational costs; and third, entrenching international norms in domestic jurisdictions and 
institutions. 
Facilitating international cooperation 
International institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing information problems, by providing rule-
based legal and political frameworks that structure the interactions of states and facilitate cooperation 
by structuring expectations and making it easier to detect cheating, and by providing sanctions for 
non-compliance.67
• The FATF, through the establishment of global anti–money-laundering standards, the 
monitoring of their implementation by both member- and non-member states (reducing 
information problems), and by recommending bilateral counter-measures against non-
compliant states; 
 Three of the agreements examined here have functions that aim at facilitating 
international cooperation.  
• UNCAC, through the provision of an international legal framework that requires states to 
criminalize offences such as bribery and embezzlement, and requiring states to provide 
                                                     
67 The literature on international institutions and cooperation is vast. For a seminal statement, see Axelrod and Keohane 
(1985).  
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assistance in the asset recovery process;68
• StAR through addressing information problems and developing templates to facilitate cross-
border cooperation (UNODC and World Bank 2007).  
 
Codifying and consolidating international norms, and increasing reputational costs 
Multilateral agreements can serve as organizational platforms that “norm entrepreneurs” can use to 
promote and entrench particular norms in international society.69 Once such norms are consolidated, 
states comply because of their normative pull (i.e., they are socialized into particular behaviours), but 
also because of the reputational costs of non-compliance. Codifying and consolidating particular 
global anti-corruption norms, such as transparency in natural resource management, increases the 
reputational costs for states that do not comply with them.70
EITI, FATF, and UNCAC all serve as organizational platforms that states and civil society actors can 
use to advance particular anti-corruption norms. All three also involve mechanisms that aim to reduce 
corruption through targeting reputational concerns of states, through public naming and shaming. 
  
• The FATF involves mutual evaluations of compliance with its standards, and publishes a list 
of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions; 
• EITI publicly reviews the progress of implementation of its transparency standards, and 
certifies countries as compliant or not, and civil society actors such as Transparency 
International, the Publish What You Pay Coalition, and Revenue Watch also monitor EITI 
compliance;  
• UNCAC has established a mechanism to review the implementation of UNCAC provisions in 
member countries. 
Entrenching international anti-corruption norms in domestic jurisdictions 
International institutions and multilateral initiatives can become transmission mechanisms that 
entrench international norms, including anti-corruption norms, in domestic jurisdictions. They do so in 
different ways, in particular by providing “blueprints” for appropriate institutions and behaviour 
(Chekel 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and by providing a framework of reference that (in 
the case of anti-corruption norms) anti-corruption campaigners can rally and organize around (Thomas 
2001). Stronger domestic anti-corruption norms can increase the cost of corruption to individuals, as 
the risk of detection and sanctions increases, and reduce corrupt behaviour by shaping the identities of 
individuals (i.e., by entrenching professional standards and making non-corrupt behaviour an integral 
part of the professional identities of civil servants, lawyers, etc.).  
All four multilateral agreements examined here aim to work at that level, especially through capacity 
building efforts, and by providing a normative reference point for civil society (especially UNCAC 
and EITI).  
The review of the research evidence on the corruption-reducing impact of multilateral agreements 
yielded only a very small number of relevant studies. The search identified only a total of 14 studies 
considered of potential relevance, and further critical appraisal reduced their number to 12.71
                                                     
68 United Nations Convention against Corruption, esp. articles 22, 26, 31, 43, and 55.  
 
69 Norm entrepreneurs are actors that actively promote and advance the development of particular social norms. See 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 
70 On reputational concerns, see Keohane (1984) and Downs and Jones (2002). 
71 See search protocol for details. 
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• No relevant studies on UNCAC were found. One reason for this might be that it is a relatively 
new agreement, the first round of peer reviews is ongoing, and it is too soon to evaluate its 
effect. 
• There were no systematic comparative studies of either EITI or FATF that examine reasons 
for compliance or non-compliance, let alone effectiveness.  
• There have been very few country-case studies evaluating the impact of either mechanism. An 
exception is Shaxson’s analysis of the Nigerian EITI process (2009). 
• The measurements when examining correlations between a decline in corruption and a 
particular mechanism are problematic, relying in particular on corruption perception data.72
Facilitation of international cooperation 
 
The small amount of evidence that exists highlights that despite agreements such as StAR, 
international cooperation remains limited: from 2006 to 2009 only 4 out of the 30 OECD countries 
examined in a study by the OECD and StAR had returned stolen assets, while a further 2 had frozen 
foreign assets (OECD and StAR 2011, 23–25). A total of US$1.225 billion had been frozen during 
that time, and US$227 million returned—out of an estimated annual US$20 billion to US$40 billion 
stolen annually from developing countries (OECD and StAR 2011).  
However, the same report also suggests that both the StAR initiative and the growing emphasis on 
asset recovery have resulted in a growing number of investigations and initiation of charges in cases of 
corruption and bribery of foreign officials.  In addition, the legal and institutional architecture 
supporting international cooperation to recover assets, especially in OECD countries, has developed 
substantially since 2006 (OECD and StAR 2011, 36–44). All this suggests that the StAR seems to 
have some impact on international cooperation, but it is too soon to effectively assess it.  
Overall, the strength of the evidence is weak, because the number of studies examining the impact of 
multilateral agreements on international cooperation on anti-corruption is very small. 
Methodologically, the studies are relatively robust: the OECD/StAR report is very clear about its data 
sources and the limitations of the data (OECD and StAR 2011, 19–20), and examines the impact of 
asset-recovery standards along a range of indicators. The inherent data problems discussed extensively 
in the report limits the strength of the evidence.  
Develop and codify international anti-corruption norms 
The reviewed evidence shows how both EITI and FATF have contributed to the consolidation of 
specific anti-corruption norms internationally: the transparency norm in natural resource governance 
(Gillies 2010; Gillies ad Dystra 2011; Haufler 2010; LeBillon 2011) and anti-money laundering norms 
(Kern 2000; Johnson and Desmond Lim 2002). The evidence put forward in support of norm 
development with regard to EITI focuses in particular on the growing number of states and resource-
extracting companies participating (and in the case of countries achieving compliance) with its 
transparency standards. Similarly the evidence on the FATF focuses on a growing number of states 
and international organizations who are members of the organization, or who commit themselves to 
minimum FATF standards.  
The evidence that this has led to compliance, in particular because of the reputational cost of non-
compliance, is both limited and contested. Ölcer finds that EITI has had no clear positive impact on 
corruption levels in candidate countries, as their corruption perception scores and World Bank control 
                                                     
72 See for example Olcer (2009). See also Aaronson (2008) Aaronson either uses perception data, or does not say where her 
data is from.  
U4 Issue 2012:7 Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption www.U4.no 
 
40 
of corruption scores are both worse than for non-EITI resource-rich countries, and have declined from 
2002 to 2007. However, his methods for calculating this are unclear (in particular it is unclear who is 
in the comparator group), and there is no discussion of disaggregated data (i.e., do EITI countries who 
are compliant, rather than just candidates, have better scores?). However, the suggestion that EITI on 
its own seems to have little impact on corruption levels is also supported by the Revenue Watch 
Institute’s data that shows that there is no unambiguous relationship between EITI implementation and 
wider revenue transparency (2010, 24). With respect to EITI, several authors note the voluntary nature 
of its transparency standards, and the unwillingness of countries like Russia, China, or key oil 
producers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Venezuela, to commit themselves to it. In addition, EITI’s 
limited transparency requirements imposed (i.e., no need to disaggregate data, and a focus on receipts 
rather than payments) and the lack of sanctions have limited the impact of reputational concerns for 
compliance with international transparency norms (Gillies 2010; Olcer 2009, 21–22). Gillies, however, 
argues convincingly that then low cost in terms of transparency that EITI imposes on states and 
companies (and which limits its impact on corruption) also helped to build a coalition of support 
among different stakeholders, and helped to entrench the norm (Gillies 2010). Johnston and Lim find 
some support for the claim that adopting the FATF recommendations have contributed to a reduction 
in money laundering in a range of FATF member countries; however, the proxy variables they have to 
use to measure the estimated changes in money laundering are far from perfect (Johnson and Lim 
2002).73
Overall, the evidence suggests that multilateral agreements can have a substantial impact on the 
development and codification of anti-corruption norms, and this evidence is strong. However, the 
evidence also shows that the impact of these agreements on compliance with anti-corruption norms is 
very limited (though it should be noted, and the studies reviewed are generally clear about this, that 
with regard to EITI it might be too early to make a confident judgement on its impact). The evidence 
that reputational concerns or sanctions (in the case of the FATF) strengthen compliance is weak, both 
because the number of available studies is too small, and because of methodological weaknesses of 
some of the studies.  
 Similarly, there is limited evidence that FATF blacklisting can impose reputational costs that 
lead to a tightening of money laundering legislation in countries with substantial service and financial 
service sectors (Johnson 2003). 
Entrenching international anti-corruption norms in domestic jurisdictions through 
multilateral agreements 
The studies reviewed only provide limited evidence for the effectiveness of the four agreements’ 
ability to entrench international anti-corruption norms in domestic societies.  
They suggest that the agreements can become a focal point for local norm entrepreneurs (though 
evidence only exists with regard to EITI), but provide no evidence that this increases the reputational 
cost of corruption for individual actors.  
Country-specific evidence that global norms become focal points for local norm entrepreneurs comes 
from Shaxson’s study of the Nigerian EITI programme: it highlights the ways in which EITI has 
become a platform around which a small group of politicians and bureaucrats advance transparency 
reforms. Shaxson’s study confirms the claim of other papers, that civil society, which is central to the 
mechanism (and which EITI aims to strengthen by giving it a central role in natural resource 
governance), is often too weak and fragmented, and lacks the capacity to manage the information 
provided by the EITI reports and push for change.74
                                                     
73 The study uses changes in a country’s overall crime rate as a proxy for changes in the illegal economy and money 
laundering. 
 The ability of EITI to serve as a focal point, and 
74 See for example Aaronson (2011) Carbonnier, Brugger, and Krause (2011), and Kolstad and Wiig (2009). 
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for civil society to hold governments and companies in the resource sector to account, is also limited 
by the kind of information that it requires governments to publish—payments do not need to be 
disaggregated by payment type or company, for example. Several studies suggest that this has limited 
the effectiveness of EITI as an anti-corruption intervention.75
9.2 Summary of evidence 
 
Overall, the evidence base for the effect of multilateral agreements on anti-corruption outcomes 
domestically is weak. The reviewed evidence only included a single detailed country-case study, and 
there were no systematic comparative studies of the impact of EITI, or of any of the other agreements. 
None of the studies examine whether EITI imposes any domestic reputational costs. There is hardly 
any rigorous empirical work addressing the domestic impact of the multilateral agreements reviewed. 
Only the finding that the effectiveness of EITI is limited by the character of the information that 
governments are required to publish under EITI and the weakness of civil society is fairly well 
supported.  
Figure 8: Multilateral 
 
                                                     
75 Examples include Olcer (2009), Shaxson (2009), and Kolstad and Wiig (2009). 
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10. Conclusion 
This paper maps and evaluates the existing evidence on anti-corruption interventions. Most strikingly, 
there is strong evidence only for two interventions: PFM reforms and audit institutions. Furthermore, 
only in the case of PFM does the evidence clearly support that such measures reduce corruption. There 
is no strong evidence that any of the interventions pursued have been ineffective, though there is fair 
evidence of ineffectiveness in regard to three interventions: anti-corruption authorities, civil service 
reform, and the use of corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions. Figure 2 below graphically 
outlines the key findings of the paper.  
The evaluation of the evidence in this paper, however, not only highlights the existence of gaps, but 
also unpacks some of the reasons for these gaps with regard to particular interventions. Across the 
interventions reviewed, the paper highlights five types of evidence gaps. 
First, for over half of the interventions examined, the findings of the evidence are mixed or even 
contested. One reason for this is the importance of local context (both local norms and the local 
political economy), which decisively shapes the impact of different interventions. This makes it 
difficult to generalize about their effectiveness. It some cases, however, the lack of consistency in the 
nature of the evidence is the consequence of the kind of research that has been conducted. In 
particular, there is a lack of comparative work that could help to identify which contextual factors 
matter, and why. 
Second, the figure highlights that for over half of the interventions, the evidence found is weak. 
Again, this has a range of reasons, and often the assessment that evidence is weak is based on a 
combination of them.  
For a range of interventions the number of relevant studies is just very low. To some extent, this 
appears to be the result of a limited focus of existing anti-corruption research on operationally relevant 
research questions in general. It also reflects that some of the interventions examined are of a 
relatively recent nature, and as a result there is insufficient data to be able to meaningfully evaluate 
their impact, or they have not attracted much scholarly attention.  
U4 Issue 2012:7 Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption www.U4.no 
 
43 
Figure 9: Anti-corruption interventions—Summary of the evidence76
  
 
                                                     
76 This figure graphically summarizes the strength of the evidence on particular interventions, and what the evidence suggests 
about their impact on corruption. Within each sector of the graph, the location of a particular intervention is not indicative of 
either its greater effectiveness or greater evidential strength compared to other interventions located in that sector. The 
figure—as the paper as a whole—does not identify the relative effectiveness of one intervention compared to others. Source: 
Authors. 
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The inherent measurement challenges of anti-corruption research mean that some of the data used in 
the studies is problematic, in particular the perceptions-based data often used for cross-country 
regression analysis studies. Beyond this, there are two recurring methodological weaknesses. First, 
especially the grey and donor literature often make implicit assumptions about causal connections 
rather than examining these claims. Second, there is a lack of comparative work (both cross-country 
and if applicable in-country) that would enable rigorous testing of hypotheses and more robust 
generalizations. 
Third, very little of the evidence comes from conflict-affected countries. There is therefore little 
engagement with pertinent issues such as the character of corruption in conflict-affected countries (are 
corruption challenges in such environments qualitatively different, or merely different in scale?), and 
the relationship between anti-corruption interventions and state- and peacebuilding efforts in conflict-
affected countries. 
Fourth, hardly any studies focus on the role of private sector actors driving corruption. 
Consequently, both an interventions and an evidence gap exist on interventions targeting corruption in 
the private sector. Few of the interventions identified focus on the “supply-side” of corruption (i.e., the 
willingness of firms or individuals to pay bribes), and how wider structural reforms (i.e., of tax or 
customs systems) could help to reduce the incentives of private sector actors to engage in corruption.  
Finally, there is little evidence on the interactions and interdependencies between different anti-
corruption interventions: how are different interventions (which are rarely implemented in isolation) 
supported (or constrained) by other interventions, and wider governance reforms? Some interventions 
which on their own might not be considered to effectively address corruption might be a necessary 
contextual reform enabling substantial anti-corruption gains through other efforts. This evidence gap 
on complementarity and sequencing of reforms thus highlights an important caveat with regard to the 
judgements about the effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions in this paper, and in figure 2 in 
particular.  
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Annex I: Search protocols for individual anti-corruption 
interventions 
This annex outlines the search processes for evidence under each category of interventions. It lists the 
relevant meta-studies that were consulted, and gives details about the searches of the two main 
databases that were used: the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) and Google Scholar.  
Database searches were conducted by title (Google Scholar) and topic (SSCI). If a search elicited more 
than 200 hits, the top 200 entries, sorted by relevance, were reviewed. A first permissive selection was 
made on the basis of the title’s relevance to the research question, which was further refined by a 
review of the abstracts of the selected papers.  
In the case of Google Scholar, sometimes multiple search strings were used, as the search mask did not 
allow for the same searches as SSCI. In these cases, the results have been added up in the table.  
Public sector reforms 
The overall research question guiding this section is: what is the evidence for the effectiveness of the 
following public sector reforms in reducing corruption? 
• Anti-corruption authorities 
• Anti-corruption laws 
• Anti-corruption strategies 
• Financial intelligence units 
• Judicial reforms 
• Police reforms 
• Civil service reforms 
• Public financial management reforms 
• Decentralization  
Search process  
Studies were identified from a search of the World Bank’s publications on anti-corruption on its 
website, the U4 website, from database searches with different search terms (see below), from 
conversations with experts, from previous knowledge, and from meta-studies of corruption. The 
included in particular:  
• Andvig, Jens and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad. 2000. Research on corruption: A policy-oriented 
survey. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
• Erickson, Moana and Roderick Hills. 2007. Research on corruption and its control. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
• Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge and Jan Isaksen. 2008. Anti-corruption reforms: Challenges, effects and 
limits to World Bank support. IEG Working Paper 2008/7. Washington, DC: World Bank 
• Hanna, Rema, Sarah Bishop, Sara Nadel, Gabe Scheffler, and Katherine Durlacher. 
2011. The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: What has worked, what hasn’t and 
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what we don’t know. Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research 
Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
• IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011. World Bank country-level engagement on 
governance and anticorruption: An evaluation of the 2007 strategy and 
implementation plan. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
• Kolstad, Ivar, Verena Fritz, and Tam O’Neill. 2008. Corruption, anti-corruption efforts, and 
aid: Do donors have the right approach? Working Paper 3. London: Overseas Development 
Institute. 
• McGee, Rosemary and John Gaventa. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of 
transparency and accountability initiatives. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies. 
• Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation). 2008. Anti-corruption 
approaches: A literature review. Oslo: Norad.  
The search identified 624 potentially relevant studies (allowing for double counting), of which 94 were 
chosen for further review after an abstract check. Forty-five of these were identified through the 
database searches; the remaining ones were identified from meta-studies or by World Bank or U4 
publications. 
Summary of database research 
Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies selected 
for further 
review after 
abstract check 
“Anti-corruption agency” OR “anti-
corruption commission” OR “anti-
corruption office” OR  
“anticorruption agency” OR 
“anticorruption commission” OR 
“anticorruption office” 
Google Scholar  
 
22,000 10 3 
SSCI 39 9 3 
“Corruption” OR “Anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption”  
AND  
“strategy” OR “strategies” 
Google Scholar 
 
19,800 36 1 
SSCI  73 10 1 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption”  
AND  
“laws” OR “Freedom of 
Information” OR “Right to 
Information” OR “asset 
declaration” 
Google Scholar 
 
 
9,740 20 3 
SSCI 
 
158 3 0 
“Financial intelligence unit” 
AND  
“success” OR “failure” OR “effect” 
OR “impact” OR “assessment” 
Google Scholar 1,370 18 5 
“Financial intelligence unit” SSCI 1 1 0 
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Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies selected 
for further 
review after 
abstract check 
“Anti-corruption” OR “corruption”  
AND  
“justice system reform” OR 
“judicial reform” 
Google Scholar 8,890 24 3 
“Anti-corruption” OR “corruption”  
AND  
“donor” OR “donor support”  
AND  
“justice system reform” OR 
“judicial reform” 
2,510 6 0 
“Anti-corruption” OR 
“anticorruption” OR “corruption” 
AND  
“justice system reform” OR 
“judicial reform” 
SSCI 3 3 0 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption”  
AND  
“police reform” 
Google Scholar 
 
4,710 23 3 
ISI Web of 
Knowledge  
36 4 1 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
 AND  
“civil service reform” OR 
“administrative reform” OR 
“institutional reform” 
Google Scholar 
 
252,000 43 4 
ISI Web of 
Knowledge  
7,019 8 0 
“Corruption” or “anti-corruption” 
AND 
“public financial management” OR 
“budget” OR “participatory 
budgeting” OR “procurement” OR 
“tax” OR “tax reform” 
Google Scholar 
 
27,020 
 
75 10 
ISI Web of 
Knowledge  
 
364 44 2 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
AND 
“decentralisation” OR 
“decentralization” OR “local 
government” 
Google Scholar 
 
14,600 5 3 
SSCI 229 20 3 
Oversight institutions 
The overall research question guiding this section is: how do oversight institutions contribute to the 
fight against corruption?  
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It looks at the role played by supreme audit institutions, parliament, ombudspersons, and courts in 
ensuring horizontal accountability within government.  
Search process  
Studies were identified from a search of the World Bank’s publications on corruption on its website, 
on the U4 website, from database searches with different search terms (see below), from conversations 
with experts, from previous knowledge, and from meta-studies of corruption, in particular:  
• Hanna et al. 2011. The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. 
• Norad. 2008. Anti-corruption approaches. 
The evidence search identified 27 potentially relevant studies. Thirteen studies address issues of audit 
and supreme audit institutions, four the role of parliament, three the role of ombudspersons and seven 
the role played by courts. 
Summary of database research 
Based on the title, all studies that clearly do not address the questions of a) supreme audit institutions, 
parliament, ombudspersons and courts, and corruption; or b) supreme audit institutions, parliament, 
ombudspersons and courts, and anti-corruption measures, in this context have been excluded (although 
indirect interventions have been included). The abstracts and, if necessary, the introduction of the 
remaining ones are then further examined to determine whether they address the research questions. 
Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies selected 
for further 
review after 
abstract check 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
 AND  
“audit institutions” OR 
“comptroller” OR “auditor general” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
35,590 14 11 
SSCI 4 2 2 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
AND 
“parliamentary support” OR 
“parliament” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
1,250 16 4 
SSCI 53 0 0 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
AND 
“ombudsman” OR 
“ombudsperson” OR 
“ombudsperson’s office” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
14,700 10 3 
SSCI 6 2 0 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption”  
AND  
“supreme court” OR “court 
independence” OR “court 
accountability” OR “judicial 
independence” OR “judicial 
accountability” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
 
20,800 12 7 
SSCI 36 1 0 
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Civil society support 
The overall research question guiding this section is: how does civil society contribute to the fight 
against corruption? 
It looks at three issues: 
• The role of social accountability and community monitoring mechanisms 
• The role of NGOs/CSOs, media, and the private sector and business associations 
• Donor efforts to support civil society in the fight against corruption 
•  
Search process  
Studies were identified from a search of the World Bank’s publications on corruption on its website, 
the U4 website, from database searches with different search terms (see below), from conversations 
with experts, from previous knowledge, and from meta-studies of corruption, in particular:  
• Hanna et al. 2011. The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. 
• Malena, Carmen, Reiner Forster, and Janmelay Singh. 2004. Social accountability: An 
Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practice. Social Development Papers, 
Paper no. 76. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
• McGee and Gaventa. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and 
accountability initiatives.  
• Norad. 2008. Anti-corruption approaches. 
The evidence search identified 37 relevant studies. Twenty-four studies address social accountability / 
community monitoring mechanisms and the role of NGOs/CSOs, five examine the role of media and 
eight examine the role of the private sector and business associations.  
Summary of database research 
Based on the title, all studies that clearly do not address the questions of a) civil society, media, private 
sector and business associations and corruption; or b) civil society / community monitoring 
mechanisms and anti-corruption measures in this context, have been excluded (although indirect 
interventions have been included). The abstracts and, if necessary, the introduction of the remaining 
ones are then further examined to determine whether they address the research questions. 
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Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies selected 
for further 
review after 
abstract check 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
AND  
“civil society” OR “civil society 
organizations” OR “CSO” OR “non-
governmental organization” OR 
“NGO” 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
AND  
“social accountability” OR 
“community monitoring” OR 
“community monitoring 
mechanism” OR “social audit” 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
OR “anticorruption” 
AND 
“awareness campaign” OR “raising 
awareness” OR “awareness raising” 
OR “advocacy” OR “pressure group” 
OR “interest group” 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
AND  
“NGO funding” OR “NGO grants” OR 
“NGO support” OR “CSO grants” OR 
“CSO funding” OR “CSO support” OR 
“civil society grants” OR “civil society 
funding” OR “civil society support” 
OR “non-governmental organization 
grants” OR “non-governmental 
organization funding” OR “non-
governmental organization support” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
multiple search 
strings) 
178,080 39 24 
SSCI (multiple 
searches) 
179 16 3 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
AND  
“media” OR “mass media” OR 
“press” OR “media freedom” OR 
“press freedom” OR “freedom of the 
press” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
 
577,000 9 5 
SSCI 263 4 2 
“Corruption” OR “anti-corruption” 
AND 
“professional association” OR 
“professional body” OR 
“professional organization” OR 
“professional society” OR “trade 
association” OR “industry trade 
group” OR “business association” OR 
“sector association” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
single search 
string) 
 
18,800 9 8 
SSCI 2 0 0 
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Direct budget support 
The overall research question guiding this section is: how can direct budget support contribute to 
reducing corruption?  
It looks at two issues: 
• The extent to which direct budget support strengthens financial management systems and 
thereby contributes to a reduction in corruption 
• The extent to which direct budget support strengthens local accountability mechanisms and 
incentives 
Search process  
Studies were identified from a search of the World Bank’s publications on corruption on its website, 
on the U4 website, from database searches with different search terms (see below), from conversations 
with experts, and from meta-studies of corruption, in particular:  
• Erickson and Hills. 2007. Research on corruption and its control. 
• Fjeldstad and Isaksen. 2008. Anti-corruption reforms 
• IEG. 2011. World Bank country-level engagement on governance and anticorruption. 
• Kolstad, Fritz, and O’Neill. 2008. Corruption, anti-corruption efforts, and aid. 
• McGee and Gaventa. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and 
accountability initiatives.  
• Norad. 2008. Anti-corruption approaches. 
• Rao, Sumedh and Heather Marquette. 2012. Corruption indicators in performance assessment 
frameworks for budget support. U4 Issue Paper 2012:1. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute.  
The search yielded 23 potentially relevant studies, of which fourteen came from the reviews and 
expert consultations, and a further nine from the database search. Of those, seven were later excluded 
as they did not address the research questions or were merely summary papers.  
Summary of database research 
Based on the title, all studies that clearly do not address the questions of a) general budget support and 
corruption; or b) general budget support and anti-corruption measures in this context, have been 
excluded (although indirect interventions have been included). The abstracts and, if necessary, the 
introduction of the remaining ones are then further examined to determine whether they address the 
research questions. The studies selected are listed below the table. 
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Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies selected 
for further 
review after 
abstract check 
“General budget support” 
AND 
“corruption” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
social sciences)77
 
 
1 0 0 
“General budget support” 
AND 
“corruption” 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
limited to social 
sciences, single 
search string) 
1,240 33 5 
“General budget support” 
AND 
“anti-corruption” 
367 24 4 
Donors’ own systems 
The overall research question guiding this section is: how do donors protect their aid against losses 
from corruption?  
It looks at two issues: 
• Taking corruption risks into account in aid allocation decisions 
• Protecting aid against corruption through project design and evaluation 
• Whether corruption is taken into account when deciding on aid modalities is discussed in the 
context of general budget support. 
Search process  
Studies were identified from a search of the World Bank’s publications on corruption on its website, 
on the U4 website, from database searches with different search terms (see below), from conversations 
with experts, from previous knowledge, and from meta-studies of corruption, in particular:  
• Erickson and Hills. 2007. Research on corruption and its control. 
• Fjeldstad and Isaksen. 2008. Anti-corruption reforms 
• IEG. 2011. World Bank country-level engagement on governance and anticorruption. 
• Kolstad, Fritz, and O’Neill. 2008. Corruption, anti-corruption efforts, and aid. 
• McGee and Gaventa. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and 
accountability initiatives.  
• Norad. 2008. Anti-corruption approaches. 
The evidence search identified 23 potentially relevant studies, of which four were later excluded, as 
they did not address the research question. Of the remaining 19, 5 address issues of aid allocation, 
                                                     
77 Search included all in one search string and individually 
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while a further 3 examine the assessments of corruption risks and political economy analysis. Three 
studies also examine the role of evaluation. 
Summary of database research 
Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number. 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies 
selected for 
further review 
after abstract 
check 
 
“Quality assurance” OR 
“evaluation” OR “risk assessment” 
OR “fiduciary risk” OR “audit” OR 
“political economy analysis” OR 
“political economic analysis” OR 
“due diligence”  
AND  
“aid” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
subject areas of 
Agriculture, 
International 
Relations, Public 
Administration, 
Government Law, 
or Anthropology) 
1,858 3 0 
 
“Quality assurance” OR 
“evaluation” OR “risk assessment” 
OR “fiduciary risk” OR “audit” OR 
“political economy analysis” OR 
“political economic analysis” OR 
“due diligence” 
AND  
“development aid” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
Social Science) 
21 6 3 
Google Scholar 
(limited to social 
science and 
administration 
and economics, 
post-1990 only) 
21 2 2 
“Sanctions”  
AND 
“corruption” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
Social Science) 
65 4 2 
Google Scholar 
(limited to social 
science and 
administration 
and economics, 
post-1990 only) 
5 0 0 
 
“Quality assurance” OR 
“evaluation” OR “risk assessment” 
OR “fiduciary risk” OR “audit” OR 
“political economy analysis” OR 
“political economic analysis” OR 
“due diligence”  
AND  
“corruption” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
Social Science) 
146 3 0 
Google Scholar 
(limited to social 
science and 
administration 
and economics, 
post-1990 only) 
83 2 1 
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Strengthening international anti-corruption norms and standards 
The search looked for literature addressing three research questions: 
• How do the selected multilateral agreements contribute to the development of global anti-
corruption norms?  
• How do these norms take root locally, in societies? 
• How do the norms embodied in these multilateral agreements affect state behaviour with 
regard to the reduction of corruption? 
Search process 
The search involved expert consultations, a search of meta-reviews, and a database search. 
Several meta-reviews of the anti-corruption literature were reviewed for relevant literature: 
• Erickson and Hills. 2007. Research on corruption and its control. 
• Fjeldstad and Isaksen. 2008. Anti-corruption reforms 
• IEG. 2011. World Bank country-level engagement on governance and anticorruption. 
• Kolstad, Fritz, and O’Neill. 2008. Corruption, anti-corruption efforts, and aid. 
• McGee and Gaventa. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and 
accountability initiatives.  
• Norad. 2008. Anti-corruption approaches. 
Of these, only the Norad (2008) study touches on the role of anti-corruption norms, but does not 
examine it in any detail, and Kolstad, Fritz and O’Neill’s (2008) work looks more generally at the role 
of norms in fuelling and containing corruption, but without specific reference to any of the multilateral 
agreements and the norms embodied in them. One study was selected for further assessment from the 
bibliographies of these meta-reviews.  
A search of the U4 website, and website of the four agreements examined identified two studies 
selected for further review. Serendipitous discovery in the course of research identified two more.  
In total, the search identified a total of 14 studies, two of which were excluded after detailed review.  
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Summary of database research 
Search string Database Number 
of hits 
Number 
of 
relevant 
studies  
Studies 
selected for 
further review 
after abstract 
check 
“Norms” OR “Standards” 
AND  
“UNCAC” OR “United Nations 
Convention against Corruption” OR 
“EITI” OR “Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative” OR “PWYP” 
OR “Publish What You Pay” OR 
“FATF” OR “Financial Action Task 
Force” OR “StAR” or “Stolen Asset 
Recovery Initiative” 
SSCI (keyword 
search, limited to 
social sciences) 
151 9 5 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
limited to social 
sciences, single 
search string) 
0 n/a n/a 
Google Scholar 
(title search, 
limited to social 
sciences, multiple 
searches 
strings)78
349 
 
8 4 
 
 
 
                                                     
78 The individual searches were for “UNCAC” OR “United Nations Convention against Corruption”; “EITI” OR 
“Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative”; “PWYP” OR “Publish What You Pay”; “FATF” OR “Financial 
Action Task Force”; “Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.” Inclusion of StAR in the last search led to a very large 
number of hits (in excess of 10,000), of which the first 200 were irrelevant, and was therefore excluded. 
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